A new player is emerging in the European space sector: Poland. This is the conclusion reached by an analysis from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), a German institute for international politics and security, prepared by researcher Juliana Süß together with Robert Sam Wilson, director of strategy and national security at the Center for Space Policy and Strategy of the Aerospace Corporation. The study highlights how Warsaw is expanding its strategic ambitions beyond the terrestrial realm, making space an essential component of its military and technological strengthening.
According to SWP experts, the war in Ukraine has made it clear how modern defense depends on space infrastructures, from satellite communications to reconnaissance, up to monitoring enemy movements. The use of the Starlink network by Ukrainian forces, as well as frequent Russian disruptions of GPS signals in the Baltic, have demonstrated that space is now a fully operational domain. For Poland, which has become a pillar of European security after 2022, this context translates into the need to invest not only in the traditional army – supported by one of NATO’s highest military budgets – but also in the space dimension.
BALANCING NATIONAL STRATEGY AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION
The German foundation recalls how Poland’s 2017 Space Strategy charted a course through 2030, identifying national strengths and weaknesses. Warsaw can rely on an advanced IT sector and experience in satellite data processing, but suffers from financial constraints and a scarcity of private capital. Despite this, the priority remains the development of satellites for Earth observation and space situational awareness (SSA) systems. These tools not only strengthen national security but also respond to broader European needs, where gaps in these sectors are still significant.
In recent years, the Polish space agency Polsa has created a monitoring center, beginning to integrate its data into the European EU SST system. Some satellites under development, also intended for civilian uses, will be built by national industries, providing a boost to the Polish supply chain and contributing to the “Eastern Shield” defense project, designed to strengthen borders with Belarus and Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave. According to the SWP authors, this approach produces benefits not only for Warsaw but also for NATO and, indirectly, for Germany, which is particularly exposed to Russian electronic interference in the Baltic.
At the European level, Poland participates in the multilateral programs of the EU and ESA, considered privileged channels to gain experience and contain costs. Participation in Galileo and Copernicus or projects like Odin’s Eye II offers valuable learning opportunities for an emerging actor. Warsaw has also significantly increased its contributions to the ESA budget, rising from less than 1% to nearly 4% in 2025, a sign of growing commitment. At the same time, Polish space diplomacy boasts deep roots, with the signing of major international space treaties and adherence to the Artemis Accords for the future lunar mission.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR GERMANY AND NATO
The United States remain a key partner: cooperation agreements on SSA services, access to the WGS satellite network, and joint communications programs strengthen transatlantic integration. For the SWP, these synergies reduce the need for Warsaw to independently develop complex systems, allowing resources to be focused on the most urgent priorities.
In this context, Berlin is called to closely observe the moves of its eastern neighbor. As the SWP authors emphasize, the development of Polish satellites could open margins for bilateral cooperation, with the possibility of complementary exchanges between optical and radar capabilities. For Germany, which is itself redefining its space policy with the new national security strategy, this represents an opportunity to strengthen the European industrial and technological fabric in an increasingly strategic sector.
NECESSARY EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
However, the SWP commentary urges caution: more capabilities do not automatically mean greater security. Without effective integration at the EU and NATO levels, the increase in data risks remaining sterile. It is necessary that information be processed quickly and shared in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, the exchange on threats and satellite protection must be an integral part of cooperation, so that systems do not themselves become vulnerable targets.
For Warsaw, expansion into space is both a political signal and a pragmatic choice. For Europe, it represents a test of the ability to transform the multiplication of national initiatives into a coherent mosaic. As Süß and Wilson remind us, space is now inseparable from the continent’s security: integrating Poland into this path is not only useful but necessary.
