Trump’s cancellation of the plan to deploy long-range missiles in Germany abruptly exposed one of Europe’s most serious and dangerous defense gaps: the lack of an autonomous Deep Precision Strike (DPS) capability.
As highlighted by the Financial Times in a recent in-depth article, we are talking about weapon systems capable of striking targets hundreds or thousands of kilometers away with extreme precision, an element that instead occupies a prominent place in the Russian arsenal.
This structural weakness, long masked by American protection, takes on particularly worrying contours in the current context of war in Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s growing assertiveness.
TRUMP’S DECISION
The plan developed during the Biden administration envisaged the deployment in Germany of a battalion equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles and Dark Eagle hypersonic weapons, to provide Europe with a DPS capability able to reach targets inside Russia or other adversaries.
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius described its cancellation – which he believes is not yet final – as “very unfortunate and damaging” for Germany and for all of Europe, warning that gaps in European capabilities are destined to widen further.
WHAT DPS IS
DPS includes missiles with a range between 1,000 and 3,000 km, characterized by very high precision that allows destroying specific buildings or even bombers during takeoff. Military experts consider it an essential element for three main reasons.
First, these missiles can deter an adversary by threatening its strategic infrastructure. Secondly, they allow responding to aggression with conventional means, without immediately resorting to large-scale conflict or nuclear weapons. Finally, they enable striking key targets beyond the front line during a conflict, such as air bases or missile silos.
A Western military officer summarized the practical utility to the FT: “You want to be able to hit a Russian drone factory before they send 500 drones against us, or a submarine before it leaves port?”
Ukrainian attacks against Russian airports used to bomb Kyiv represent a concrete example. Also, the American threats in 2022 to use long-range missiles against Russian military assets in case of nuclear use by Putin were considered decisive in deterring him.
Camille Grand, Secretary General of the Aerospace, Security, and Defence Industries Association for Europe, emphasizes that DPS offers a conventional deterrence element that can make “a huge difference,” allowing inflicting pain at a distance on a potential adversary without immediately resorting to extreme consequences.
WHY EUROPE HAS NOT DEVELOPED DPS
For decades Europe has neglected this sector for two main reasons: the protection guarantee offered by the United States and the fear of provoking Russia.
During the Cold War and afterwards, Washington provided the main conventional deterrence, both from American bases and through missiles based in Europe.
Moreover, the 1987 INF Treaty between Moscow and Washington, which banned missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, hindered the development of land-based systems. As Grand notes, this was not negligence but a cautious choice not to violate the agreement, which anyway lapsed in 2019 amid mutual accusations of violation.
Even if they wanted to, the United States have limited stocks of these systems due to high consumption in recent conflicts and their strategic shift toward the Pacific.
Europe possesses some missiles, such as the German and Spanish Taurus, with a range of about 500 km, or the Franco-British Storm Shadow/Scalp, which however are short-range, air-launched, and present in limited quantities. Using them would require air superiority over Moscow, difficult without American help.
France and the United Kingdom have long-range naval weapons, such as the French MdCN with 1,400 km range and the British submarine-launched Tomahawks with 1,600 km range, but lack conventional equivalents to their nuclear ballistic missiles.
EUROPEAN VULNERABILITY
Without the capability to strike naval bases like Murmansk or Novorossiysk, or sites near Moscow, Europe is at a strong disadvantage. Russia has cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges over 2,000 km, such as the Kinzhal or the 9M729, capable of reaching Warsaw, Berlin, Munich and, from Kaliningrad, even London, Paris, and Rome.
This disparity limits Europe’s deterrence capability and complicates crisis planning. Without American DPS, managing a crisis with Russia would become much more complicated, notes Grand.
The absence of autonomous systems also means that Europe depends on Washington’s approval to use certain weapons, reducing its strategic sovereignty.
EUROPEAN PLANS TO CLOSE THE GAP
Recently, European countries have become aware of the problem and are trying to develop long-range land-launched missiles deployable from their own territory.
In 2024 Germany, France, Poland, and Italy launched the Elsa program (European Long-range Strike Approach), later expanded to the United Kingdom and Sweden, which includes various projects, some aiming to develop missiles with ranges over 2,000 km. However, most projects are still in early stages and will not be ready before the mid-2030s.
There are faster intermediate solutions, such as adapting the French MdCN for land or air launches. Companies like Destinus already produce over 2,000 cruise missiles per year and are developing systems like the Ruta Block 2. Recently Destinus announced a joint venture with Rheinmetall.
Destinus CEO Mikhail Kokorich emphasizes that a single centralized program is not enough: multiple industrial pathways, speed, and interoperable production are needed.
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom are aligned on the strategic problem, but differ in industrial cultures, approaches to export controls, and sovereignty priorities.
Minister Pistorius announced the intention to tap into “Ukrainian know-how.” Kyiv has in fact developed the Flamingo cruise missile, with a range of over 3,000 km, and long-range drones used against Russian refineries and depots. Mbda is also working on attack drones with ranges over 500 km.
Fabian Hoffmann of the Norwegian Defence University College urges buying everything available quickly, even imperfect solutions: “In the end – he concludes – if you’re a beggar, you can’t be choosy.”
