The Defence investment plan (Dip) presented by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer on June 30th is destined to remain somewhat historic for several reasons. First of all, because this plan for the future investments of the United Kingdom Armed Forces is proposed by a resigning Prime Minister, who will leave Downing Street in a few weeks. Secondly, because its development was particularly long (originally, in fact, its publication was even scheduled for last October) as well as very complicated.
So much so that, and here we come to the third particularity, the difficulties in its approval had led to the controversial resignation of Defence Secretary John Healey; the reason for the dispute was the scarce resources allocated, with Healey himself dissatisfied with what was promised.
But this Dip will also be remembered for a specific choice. One among many, some might object; and that is true. Only this specific choice represents a truly important innovation. And here the reference goes to what was decided for the Royal Navy (incidentally, already anticipated in the days before the publication of the document in question) regarding the creation of a so-called “hybrid fleet.”
SOME “HISTORICAL” NOTES
Before the arrival of the aforementioned Dip, the Royal Navy itself had developed development plans for its surface fleet; specifically, they provided for the construction of a new class of 5 frigates, generically referred to as Type 32 and equally generically intended to increase interaction between traditional platforms and the more innovative “unmanned” ones (the so-called naval drones). In addition to this, the future construction of some destroyers called Type 83 was planned, optimized for air/missile defense missions; also in this case, recently the option had emerged to pair them with other drones as well.
With the Dip, however, everything changes, the requirement for both the Type 32 and, above all, the Type 83 disappears; both platforms will therefore be replaced by a new class of at least 6 units currently known as “Common combat vessel” (or Ccv). Behind this generic definition lies the real innovative concept; these units will in fact be a true “control hub” primarily for naval drones (surface and underwater) but also aerial. In short, the perfect application of the concept expressed above: “hybrid fleet.” A fleet born to best integrate ships and submarines with a wide range of “drones” of all types.
WHAT WE KNOW TODAY
Going even more into detail (albeit very relative, because to date very little is known about many fundamental aspects) these Ccv will be accompanied by 4 different types of naval drones; 3 of these already in the design phase and one completely new. And precisely because very little is known beyond the general concept, one can only try to formulate hypotheses.
Regarding the Ccv themselves, the most recurring idea is that it will be a platform based on Babcock’s Arrowhead 140 project, which is already giving life to the Type 31 class frigates (Inspiration class) currently under construction in 5 units for the Royal Navy; a choice that appears logical, since it would exploit an already more mature project. Beyond the exact platform that will be chosen, there are 2 different schools of thought about its characteristics; the first hypothesizes a ship with “basic” operational capabilities (since the more significant ones would be assigned to the naval “drones”) but with important command and control capabilities of the latter, while the second outlines a scenario in which the Ccv itself will still be a fully-fledged warship (with the aforementioned command and control capabilities).
Equally “mysterious” is the picture of the drones that will operate alongside the Ccv; in order, Type 91, 92, 93 and 94. The first 3, as mentioned, are already present in the British Navy’s plans while the fourth is new. Regarding the Type 91, it will be a platform dedicated to carrying multiple weapon systems; in particular, missiles (especially those intended for air defense, such as the Aster and CAMM) and prospectively also directed energy weapons such as lasers. In fact, it will operate as an “additional missile magazine,” with particular emphasis on the air defense/anti-missile/anti-drone mission; overall, and at least for now, no particular offensive capabilities (against other ships/land targets) seem to emerge insofar as it is possible that these remain on the Ccv (although future integrations on the Type 91 themselves cannot be excluded).
The Type 92 and 93 will be very different drones but their operational field will be similar; the first will be a surface unit while the second will be an underwater drone but both will be primarily assigned to submarine detection and underwater surveillance in general thanks to the rich sonar equipment.
The Type 94, finally, will assume the role of “radar picket ship”; therefore dedicated to missions of discovery and tracking of air and naval targets at long distances, with the ability to share tactical information/data with other fleet units. A final technical consideration, the indications about the development of a common platform (hypothesized to be between 70 and 95 meters long) for Type 91 and 92; which would then be outfitted in the 2 different configurations. It is possible at this point that the reasoning could be extended also to the Type 94, for a choice that would thus be farsighted in terms of cost containment.
A TRUE REVOLUTION; WITH MANY QUESTION MARKS
Several factors have certainly influenced the Royal Navy’s path towards this radical choice; some obvious, others more “unconfessable.” The war in Ukraine is indeed demonstrating (albeit with all the necessary caveats) how naval drones can impact naval operations.
Not by chance, in other countries beyond the United Kingdom there is also a proliferation of such platforms; foremost among them, the United States, which in recent months has begun to finalize the work started some time ago to build units of size and characteristics similar to those imagined by the Royal Navy. And this is just one example, because everything suggests that other navies will follow; strengthened by technological progress (think only of Artificial Intelligence) that is occurring in many fields.
But alongside this more obvious aspect, there is another more hidden one. The British Navy itself has long been struggling with a recruitment crisis so severe that it prevents it from fully sustaining its personnel. Hence the decision to give up 2 new classes of “traditional” units may end up appearing not so much a free choice as a forced path precisely to cope with the current and future personnel shortage.
If this is the general context, even from a more technical point of view doubts and questions abound. First of all, it will be necessary to understand whether the future Type 91, 92 and 94 will actually be “unmanned” or if they will retain the possibility of hosting small crews on board. This is to address one of the great dilemmas involving naval “drones”; namely, how to manage the possibility of malfunctions and/or damage on board or how to guarantee close-in defense of platforms without personnel embarked. In other words, to reflect on how much and how technological innovations can really completely replace humans; especially in combat operations.
But the challenges do not end here, because another element to watch carefully will be the ability to ensure constant connection between the command ships (the Ccv, precisely) and the drones; which could also be dispersed at great distances from those ships; in an operational environment potentially characterized by constant electronic warfare and “cyber” intrusions, the risk is therefore to easily lose contact/control of the drones themselves.
Finally, no less important is another crucial aspect to clarify: the balance in the classic equation involving platform complexity, costs, and the final number of naval drones built. It is indeed evident that in this area, the possibility of containing costs while ensuring the ability to deploy as many drones as possible becomes fundamental.
As seen, doubts and concerns are still many; so much so that quite a few analysts have “harshly” commented on this choice, considering it too risky and believing that “manned” units should still have a role in future naval operations. Beyond personal opinions, one fact is already emerging on the horizon: to date it is expected that the Ccv and related drones will enter service in the next decade. At that point, with the ships at sea, it will really be possible to understand more.
