Chinese President Xi Jinping is going through one of the most serious crises of his thirteen years in power. As explained by the New York Times, which dedicates an extensive report to the issue, the vast purge that has hit the military leadership is no longer just an anti-corruption campaign, but a real reckoning that has decimated the elite of the armed forces.
Generals once untouchable have fallen one after another, including Zhang Youxia, Xi’s former right-hand man.
At a time of growing tension with the United States, the Chinese leader appears obsessed with absolute loyalty, to the point of jeopardizing the very military modernization project he had so painstakingly built.
UNPRECEDENTED PURGE
The images from the recent legislative meeting are telling. A year earlier, the hall was full of about forty generals; this time their presence was reduced to a handful.
With a stern expression, Xi warned the survivors: the army “must never have anyone with a divided heart towards the Party.” An ancient and meaningful phrase, taken from classical texts about traitorous generals, revealing how deep his suspicion has become.
THE FALL OF THE MOST LOYAL
What began as a targeted operation against corruption has turned into a radical cleansing. Dozens of high-ranking officers have been removed, two former defense ministers have been sentenced to death with a suspended sentence, which effectively means life imprisonment, and at the beginning of 2026, Zhang Youxia, the man who appeared among the closest to Xi, also fell.
According to some reconstructions, the point of no return came when Xi tried to promote the general responsible for investigations to a position equivalent to his own. Zhang’s objection cost him his job.
HU JINTAO’S LESSON
Xi came to power determined not to repeat his predecessor’s mistakes. Former President Hu Jintao appeared weak in front of military commanders: in 2011, during a visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, he seemed as surprised as the guests by the test of a Chinese stealth fighter. For Xi, this was unacceptable.
Already in 2014, in the symbolic speech given at Gutian – the place where Mao established that “the Party commands the gun” – he issued a severe warning about corruption, cronyism, and inefficiency undermining the armed forces.
For Xi, corruption was not just a money problem, but an existential threat to his power. Generals like Xu Caihou, accused of selling promotions, represented the worst betrayal: professing loyalty to the Party while eroding its foundations.
The examples from the Middle East and the Soviet Union had convinced him that a disloyal army can overthrow a leader. For this reason, he forcefully imposed “political work,” indoctrination, and ideological control, defining loyalty as something absolute.
XI’S REFORMS
Over the years, Xi has revolutionized the military structure: he replaced the old regions with new integrated commands, strengthened his direct control through the “president’s responsibility system,” and personally selected many commanders.
Zhang Youxia, with his combat experience in the border war with Vietnam and his solid revolutionary pedigree, seemed the right man to lead the transformation: aircraft carriers, hypersonic missiles, expanding nuclear arsenal.
In 2018, Xi was already talking about a “historic transformation” that had “saved the army.”
THE RISE OF THE INQUISITOR
Everything changed starting in 2023. The sudden dismissal of the Missile Force leadership and the removal of the defense minister shattered the image of stability.
Xi responded by summoning commanders to Yan’an, another Maoist stronghold, to impose an even deeper “political rectification.” Since then, the purges have intensified. Gaining more and more power was General Zhang Shengmin, a political commissar with little operational experience but great skill in indoctrination and internal investigations.
THE DILEMMA BETWEEN LOYALTY AND COMPETENCE
The Chinese army today is deeply divided: on one side commanders pushing for combat readiness, on the other inquisitors focused on ideological purity.
Zhang Shengmin’s promotion to vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission probably represented the last straw.
Zhang Youxia and his deputy opposed it, believing that placing an investigator in such a high position would damage the army’s combat credibility. Opposition that came at a high price: the official accusation against them speaks of having “severely trampled” Xi’s direct control system.
GROWING MISTRUST
The purge reveals an Xi in the declining phase of his power: more suspicious, more anxious about those close to him, more inclined to prioritize absolute loyalty over experience.
The great military modernization project, one of his most important successes, now risks slowing down precisely because of the cleanup the president considers indispensable.
Beijing now has to manage a powerful apparatus on paper but shaken by continuous internal earthquakes. The message to the remaining generals is clear: in this army, there is room only for those whose hearts are entirely devoted to the Party. And, essentially, to Xi.
