The debate on defense spending in Italy has now taken on characteristics that could be described as “karstic”; it disappears for long periods (and this is already not a good thing, since a continuous and mature discussion on the topic would be highly appropriate) only to suddenly reappear when new facts emerge that ignite political controversies, attract media attention, and divide public opinion.
What happened just in recent days is the perfect demonstration of this; with the Minister of Defense publicly revealing correspondence with his Government colleague and head of the Ministry of Economy and Finance to find out his intentions regarding the Safe funds given the imminence of important deadlines. This was immediately followed by the letter from the Prime Minister to the EU Commission, in which the request for greater flexibility on the spending front is reiterated; threatening “retaliation” precisely on the defense spending front.
THE STARTING POINT
It was March 4, 2025, when the President of the European Commission Von der Leyen presented the “ReArm Europe” plan, which aims to stimulate an increase in military spending by member countries. In fact, it rests on 2 mechanisms; the first is the Safe loan (Security Action For Europe), funds of €150 billion raised on the market by the European Commission itself and then distributed to individual countries that request them to allocate to investments.
The second is the possibility offered to member countries to activate the so-called “National Escape Clause” (Nec) or “Safeguard Clause”; for a period of 4 years, it will be allowed to spend in deficit up to 1.5% of GDP without it being counted for the Stability and Growth Pact (and with wider margins than the Safe).
After an initial (and surprising) skepticism by the Italian Government on both instruments, the Executive’s position gradually changed; so much so that at the end of last July there was the official confirmation that Italy had also submitted a request for Safe funds amounting to €14.9 billion.
The picture became even clearer last October when the Ministry of Economy and Finance presented the Public Finance Programming Document (DPFP), intended to form the foundation on which the subsequent 2026-2028 Budget Law would be based, with an attached hypothesis of a significant growth path for Defense spending in the same three-year period.
Specifically, it speaks of a +0.15% of GDP in 2026, a further 0.15% in 2027 (thus, a total of +0.3%) and finally, another 0.2% in 2028 (for a final total of 0.5%). In steady state, that is, in 2028 defense spending should have been half a percentage point higher on GDP compared to 2025; a value corresponding to over €12.2 billion.
The entire increase was therefore expected to rely on the already mentioned Safe loan funds (at that time not yet approved, a step that happened shortly thereafter) and, another novelty, on the activation of the “Safeguard Clause”; the latter, however, on the condition that during 2026 Italy would exit the excessive deficit procedure.
A somewhat fragile “construction,” since the hypothesized increases were based almost solely on future events not yet certain. Not surprisingly, the 2026-2028 Budget Law presented shortly thereafter did not provide for increased resources for the Defense sector (except for some strictly “technical” aspects), thus postponing everything to the recourse to the steps indicated in the DPFP itself.
THE FIRST “COLD SHOWER”
On April 21, Eurostat announced the official data on the deficit/GDP ratio in 2025 for EU countries; confirming what had already been anticipated by Istat, for Italy this value is 3.1%, thus remaining above the 3% threshold that puts a country under an excessive deficit procedure. The second of the two planned steps, the activation of the “Safeguard Clause,” thus suffers a sharp slowdown; and an important part of the rearmament process imagined by the October Document therefore begins to falter heavily.
Aside from the controversies following the announcement of that data and especially to provide a complete picture, it is highlighted that there is no rule preventing a country under procedure from activating the Nec. The Government’s decision to renounce it is/would therefore be a purely political choice; understandable (in light of a still very delicate public finance situation) but still a free choice.
BUT IT DOESN’T END HERE
Because as mentioned earlier, in recent days the issue of the “dispute” between the two Ministers Crosetto and Giorgetti over the Safe funds has taken center stage; and then, indeed, that of the Prime Minister with the EU always on the “Safeguard Clause.”
Regarding the former, the impasse appears at least unusual, since these funds are now to be considered “acquired” and not using them therefore seems illogical; if not, even, a kind of “waste.” After all, it was the Minister of Economy and Finance himself who highlighted the advantages of this instrument once applied to financing ongoing investment programs; namely lower interest rates compared to those our country would have to resort to for the same purpose, plus a series of equally favorable technical aspects.
But the situation was further complicated by the Prime Minister’s letter. In it, as already mentioned, there is a renewed request to extend the scope of application of the Nec to include the energy issue. If this were not the case, literally, it would be very difficult for the Government to explain to public opinion any recourse to the Safe program.
Now, as “noble” as the intentions behind this initiative may be, one cannot help but note that on the one hand there is an appeal to a rather bold logical leap; that is, linking such different issues together and, on the other hand, a clear abdication of the fundamental role of politics; which means making important albeit unpopular decisions, without necessarily yielding to public opinion.
A complex picture then; within which, at least to date, how the Executive intends to move is still unclear; whether it will really give up the Safe funds and/or the activation of the Nec, perhaps postponing it to next year in the hope that in the meantime our country can exit the excessive deficit procedure. Or, whether in the end the “courage” will be found to use both available instruments following discussions with the EU.
In all this, one cannot help but highlight a paradox, linked to the fact that in the past more than one Government official had pressed the EU Commission to give the green light to exclude defense spending from the Stability and Growth Pact. Hence, it is somewhat surprising that, once this measure was granted thanks to the introduction of the Nec, our country today appears particularly “skeptical.”
A COUNTRY DEEPLY IMMATURE ON DEFENSE ISSUES
So, while waiting to know the final outcome of both matters (Safe and Nec), an outcome that is by no means trivial since it will determine not only the amount of resources available for the Armed Forces in the coming years but also the possibility of launching important reforms, remains the unpleasant feeling of an Italy constantly struggling with a sort of “collective psychodrama” on defense issues.
A country still unable to face lucidly the challenges coming from an increasingly complicated international context, characterized by ever more violent crises and a constant evolution of threats; and which instead of responding responsibly to these challenges ends up yielding to the mechanism of seeking easy consensus. In all this, one cannot fail to highlight how Italy’s very international credibility ends up, due to erratic and confused choices, being undermined; thus fueling the (unfortunately not new) image of a country that is not particularly reliable.
