Latin America has become the subject of an undeclared contest between the United States and the European Union. On one side, the weapon is support for the right-wing or far-right populism that is spreading across the region election after election. On the other, there are trade agreements that promise to bring economic prosperity, equal partnerships, and legal stability. In its diversification policy, Europe is increasing its presence in the US “backyard.” The historic agreement with Mercosur, reached after 25 years of negotiations, has effectively led the EU to have trade agreements with almost all countries in the region, except Cuba and Venezuela. The modernization of the trade agreement with Mexico was the latest piece of the diversification strategy in the region. The EU does not leave the Caribbean front uncovered either. Last week, the Trade Commissioner, Maroš Šefčovič, participated in the ministerial meeting between the EU and the 15 CARICOM states in the Dominican Republic.
But, with Donald Trump’s second presidency, the motto “America First” has effectively extended to the entire American continent. The US operation in Venezuela last January, with the kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro and the establishment of a transitional government led by Delcy Rodríguez, and the recent indictment of former Cuban president Raúl Castro with Washington’s encirclement of the Havana regime, forced to implement reforms to avoid capitulation, are just the latest symptoms of a political transformation of the Latin American subcontinent, accelerated by Trump’s re-election.
Trump’s statements at the beginning of his second term revived the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which introduced US dominance in the continent against European colonization in the Americas, with the subsequent Roosevelt Corollary, which established the right to intervene in Latin America to prevent instability or European interference. Experience teaches that trying to frame Trump’s actions in political doctrines or geopolitical positions is a futile exercise. But the messages launched at the start of his second term seem to leave no doubt about the intention to make the American continent the United States’ domain.
Reclaiming the Panama Canal (which Trump claimed was permeated by Chinese interests), ousting communist regimes in Venezuela and Cuba (and perhaps later Nicaragua), annexing Canada as the 51st state (or Greenland), changing the name of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America (not internationally recognized): these are all elements going in this direction. So far, the only success achieved is in Venezuela, which has effectively removed protection and energy resources from allied Cuba (and Nicaragua).
Behind Trump’s bully-like behavior, there is a political evolution that favors his ambitions to control Latin America. The entire region is experiencing a rightward shift similar to that occurring in Europe. The so-called “pink tide,” which saw the rise of socialist governments in Latin America (1998–2015), is now being replaced by a “gray tide,” composed of populist right-wing presidents whose campaigns focus on security slogans and anti-establishment messages.
The latest shift occurred in Colombia, where on June 21 the nationalist candidate supported by Trump, Abelardo de la Espriella, surprisingly won, defeating the left-wing candidate Iván Cepeda, ending the experience of President Gustavo Petro, the first leftist presidency in Colombian history, but worn down by issues related to security, economy, and drug trafficking. Shortly before, in Peru, after a very tight count, conservative Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former dictator Alberto, convicted for human rights violations, managed to win the presidency by a narrow margin after three failed attempts.
A preview of the rightward shift had already been experienced in 2019 in Brazil, when right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro came to power. In 2023, it was Javier Milei, the anarcho-capitalist, who conquered Argentina with an anti-establishment message against the clientelist subsidy politics of leftist Peronism. In March of this year, the far-right government of José Antonio Kast took office in Chile, succeeding the far-left government of Gabriel Boric. The emblematic case is El Salvador, where President Nayib Bukele, re-elected in 2024, has imposed a security crackdown freeing the country from the grip of gangs, albeit at the expense of procedural guarantees and individual rights. This model has been adopted by the new president of Costa Rica, Laura Fernández, elected thanks to the security shift of her predecessor.
Now all eyes are on the most important political test: the October presidential elections in Brazil, which should see the incumbent leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, face a candidate close to former president Jair Bolsonaro (now under house arrest), probably his son Flávio. Brazil, besides being the largest country in Latin America, holds a very particular position: a partner of the EU, but at the same time a promoter of the Global South and a member of the BRICS, the political forum that brings together Russia, China, India, and South Africa, and of the New Development Bank, in opposition to the World Bank and the IMF.
In this division no longer into Cold War ideological spheres, but into regional spheres of influence, Europe seeks allies to avoid the “night of multilateralism,” according to the definition of the President of the European Council, António Costa, in a speech to the Mexican Senate. It continues on the pragmatic path of trade agreements, waiting to reap the results of the Mercosur agreement, provisionally applied since May 1, which could in the future perhaps extend to Bolivia and maybe even Venezuela.
The Mercosur agreement offers the EU a competitive advantage over China and the United States, explains Paolo Garzotti, head of unit of the Commission’s Trade Directorate and negotiator of the agreement. “Today we are everywhere behind China,” recalls the negotiator, citing the large deep-water port recently opened by Beijing in Chancay, Peru. But “the Chinese do not have an agreement with Mercosur. Consequently, we have the opportunity to put European companies on a more advantageous footing.” Not only that, “these countries want to trade more with us than with China. They have no interest, like us, in becoming dependent on a single country.”
The same applies to the renewed strategic interest in the area by the United States. “The Trump administration,” explains the Commission official, “is paying very particular attention to this region, deciding to conclude reciprocal agreements with Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, and El Salvador. We arrived first, and it is important that we exploit this first-mover advantage.” History will tell whether arriving first with trade agreements will allow Europeans to be stronger than Trumpist ideology to avoid the “night of multilateralism” and preserve their interests in Latin America.
(Excerpt from the European Morning Brief)
