The Strait of Hormuz has always been one of the most delicate points on the planet for oil transportation. Today, that narrow and shallow stretch of sea also risks becoming a vulnerable digital bottleneck. Dozens of fiber optic cables run along its seabed, carrying the vast majority of internet traffic between Asia, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Europe.
Damage to them, whether intentional or accidental, could cause partial blackouts, massive slowdowns in cloud services, and serious economic repercussions for Gulf countries investing billions in digital transition and artificial intelligence.
Iran has already warned about this vulnerability. As reported by the Jerusalem Post, the semi-official Tasnim agency, close to the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), warned that “the concentration of many internet cables in a single narrow passage has made the Strait of Hormuz a vulnerable point for the region’s digital economy.”
So far, the cables have remained intact, but the risk of sabotage or collateral damage related to military operations is real and growing.
The invisible backbone of the connected world
Submarine cables are fiber optic cables protected by layers of steel, copper, and insulating materials, laid on the seabed. They transmit data in the form of light pulses at very high speed and very low latency.
As Reuters points out, these cables carry about 99% of global internet traffic, as well as telecommunications links and, in some cases, even electrical power.
In the Strait of Hormuz, characterized by relatively shallow seabeds, the cables are more accessible but also more exposed. Telecom companies try to protect them by burying the most critical sections or using reinforced armoring, but in a context of open war these technical measures offer limited protection.
The main cables crossing the strait
Several important international systems pass through or skirt the Strait of Hormuz.
Among the most relevant are: 1) Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1): connects Southeast Asia to Europe via Egypt, with landing points in the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. It is one of the main backbones for traffic between Asia and Europe; 2) FALCON: a system connecting India, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives to the Gulf countries, extending to Sudan and Egypt. It has been operational for years and remains essential for regional connectivity; 3) Gulf Bridge International Cable System (GBI): creates a ring connecting all Gulf countries, including Iran, with branches to India and Europe. It is the first major system entirely controlled by Middle Eastern operators.
As reported by the Jerusalem Post citing Tasnim, at least seven major cables actually pass through the strait, including TGN-Gulf and branches of the SEA-ME-WE systems. The map published by the Iranian agency clearly shows how concentrated this infrastructure is in such a narrow passage.
Fragility
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have invested billions to diversify their economies focusing on artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and data centers.
Companies like G42 and Humain in the UAE, or stc in Saudi Arabia, aim to become regional and global players.
As highlighted in a report by the Stimson Center, to scale these investments and serve clients outside the Gulf, it is essential to have high-capacity connections to Asia, Europe, and Africa. Much of this depends on the submarine cables crossing Hormuz.
As Reuters reports, quoting analyst Masha Kotkin, damage to these cables would mean “internet slowing down or completely losing connectivity, interruptions in e-commerce, delays in financial transactions, and economic repercussions of all kinds.”
Risks
So far, the cables have been spared, while Iranian drones have already hit Amazon Web Services data centers in Bahrain and the Emirates.
The greatest danger at the moment is not necessarily a direct attack with mines or divers, although the IRGC still has fast patrol boats for asymmetric operations, but rather collateral damage.
As Reuters points out, in a situation of active military operations the risk increases that damaged or drifting ships drag anchors on the seabed, cutting cables. This already happened in the Red Sea in 2024, when a ship hit by the Houthis interrupted several cables precisely by dragging its anchor.
“The longer the conflict lasts, the higher the probability of unintentional damage,” warned analyst Masha Kotkin.
According to the Jerusalem Post, the IRGC could use its light naval units precisely for targeted sabotage operations against this critical infrastructure.
Repairing cables in a war zone
Repairing a submarine cable is not technically complex, but in contested waters it becomes a logistical nightmare. Permits are needed to enter territorial waters, which can delay intervention by weeks or months.
As Reuters reports quoting Alan Mauldin of TeleGeography, “often one of the biggest problems is obtaining permits to access the waters where the damage occurred. This can take a very long time.”
Currently, there are only 63 specialized cable repair ships worldwide, of which only 2-4 are in the Middle East region. A standard repair costs between 1 and 3 million dollars and requires at least 40 days. In wartime conditions, times lengthen considerably, as demonstrated by delays recorded in the Red Sea after the Houthi attacks.
The alternatives
Gulf countries would not be completely isolated: there are land connections and other alternative cable routes. However, reserve capacity is limited.
As Alan Mauldin noted to Reuters, “you can’t just switch to satellites. It’s not an alternative.” LEO systems like Starlink can offer backup for individual users but are not capable of handling the traffic volume of entire cities or large data centers.
For this reason, as highlighted by the Stimson Center, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are pushing hybrid projects combining submarine routes and land links through Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.
These routes shift the risk from sea to land but introduce new regulatory and security complexities.
What’s at stake
Severe damage to the Strait cables would not only affect the Gulf countries. Slowdowns and outages would propagate toward Europe, South Asia, and Africa, with cascading effects on finance, commerce, and digital services. The conflict is already blocking new cable projects, just as happened in the Red Sea.
In the long term, this situation could accelerate investments in diversified land routes or systems that completely bypass the region.
For now, however, Hormuz remains a point of extreme shared fragility: Iran knows it well, the Gulf is becoming aware of it, and major international tech companies are learning it firsthand.
