Seven years may seem like an eternity in Asian diplomacy. For this reason, Xi Jinping’s arrival in Pyongyang, the Chinese leader’s first trip to North Korea after years of absence, took on a value that goes far beyond the official celebrations of the mutual assistance treaty between the two countries. Behind the images of cordiality that Xi and Kim Jong-un offered to their respective public opinions, there is in fact a broader geopolitical game, in which Beijing seeks to reaffirm its central role on the Korean peninsula, in competition with its Russian ally, who in turn has strengthened its presence alongside the North Korean regime.
A SUCCESS FOR KIM
For Kim Jong-un, the visit primarily represented a symbolic victory. Hosting one of the most influential leaders on the planet gave the North Korean government a powerful tool for internal legitimization. The presence of the Chinese president allowed Pyongyang to show its population that it is not isolated on the international stage and can count on the support of a great power.
The meeting also reinforced Kim’s image as a recognized interlocutor by the main global actors. In recent years, the North Korean leader has consolidated relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, intensifying cooperation with Moscow in military and strategic fields. Xi’s arrival helped project the image of a North Korea at the center of a network of relations involving two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
THE SILENT COMPETITION WITH MOSCOW
China and North Korea are bound by an agreement signed 65 years ago, which remains the only bilateral defense treaty signed by Beijing. Since the Korean War, the People’s Republic has been the main political and economic partner of its neighbor.
In the last two years, however, Russia has gained ground. Pyongyang has provided men, ammunition, and support to Moscow in the war against Ukraine, receiving in return technological assistance, military cooperation, and energy supplies.
In this scenario, Xi’s trip also took on the meaning of a political message. Beijing intends to remind that North Korea remains part of its sphere of influence. This is not an open challenge to the Kremlin, but a reaffirmation of an established hierarchy. China accepts the collaboration between Moscow and Pyongyang but wants to prevent this development from reducing its strategic weight.
According to Western analysts, the rapprochement between North Korea and Russia does not align with China’s long-term interests, which remains determined to preserve its capacity to influence the North Korean regime.
THE FACTOR OF REGIONAL SECURITY
Chinese motivations are not limited to competition with Russia. For Beijing, North Korea continues to serve as a buffer zone in a region marked by increasing tensions. Relations between China and Japan remain marked by territorial disputes and strategic divergences, and the strengthening of cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and Japan is closely monitored by the Chinese leadership.
In this context, maintaining a privileged link with Pyongyang means for Xi avoiding that other actors acquire decisive influence in an area considered crucial for China’s national security. The possible consequences of military collaboration between Russia and North Korea are also followed with caution. If Moscow were to transfer technologies capable of significantly enhancing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the risk would be provoking a response from Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul, further fueling regional tensions. And Beijing has no desire for tensions already high in other parts of the globe to move just a stone’s throw from home.
BEIJING’S ECONOMIC LEVER
Alongside the strategic dimension, the economic one remains fundamental. Despite the growing relationship with Russia, North Korea continues to depend largely on China for foreign trade and access to markets.
According to estimates, about 85 percent of North Korean exports find an outlet in China, a figure that confirms how much Kim’s regime remains tied to its neighbor despite international sanctions imposed for the nuclear program and human rights violations. In the past year, air connections between the two countries have resumed, and since last spring the two capitals have been connected by passenger trains, although for the moment travel to North Korea is allowed only for those traveling for work reasons, government officials, students, and family members.
This very dependence constitutes one of the most effective tools at Beijing’s disposal. The ability to influence trade exchanges, despite Moscow’s attempts to develop new cross-border transport infrastructures with North Korea, guarantees China leverage that no other partner can match.
