Francesco Gaetano Caltagirone breaks the hesitation. And, in an interview given to the Corriere della Sera, he turns an assembly defeat into a much broader political-financial message. The target is not only Luigi Lovaglio, nor just the new alliance that secured the CEO of Mps. The real target is Banco Bpm. And, indirectly, also that part of the Lega and the government that looks favorably at a third banking pole centered on the institution led by Giuseppe Castagna.
THE TORPEDO ON BANCO BPM
During the Monte dei Paschi assembly, it should be remembered, Banco Bpm supported the Plt list pro-Lovaglio, contributing to the defeat of the area close to the Roman entrepreneur which put forward Fabrizio Palermo as candidate, who a few days ago also resigned as councilor of the new board.
Caltagirone’s words seem addressed not only to Siena, but also to Rome and Milan. “I fear that the result of the recent assembly favors on one side the merger of Mps into Bpm destroying something that has existed for five centuries in Siena, and on the other that there may be a new assault on Italian savings,” says the Roman builder. “I have the perception that there are strong forces so that in a possible merger between Bpm and Mps it is Bpm that absorbs Mps and not vice versa, with the effect of moving the headquarters to Milan and dispersing both the supply chain and that treasure of professionalism that has accumulated over the years in the oldest bank in the world.”
It is not just an industrial criticism. It is a stance that also speaks to politics. Because the project of a systemic strengthening of Banco Bpm through Siena has long been considered close to the wishes of the Lega, and in particular of the Minister of Economy Giancarlo Giorgetti, who has always looked closely at the construction of a pole alternative to the dominant large groups.
Caltagirone seems to overturn the narrative. The risk is not that of a too weak Mps, but of an Mps absorbed and emptied. He does not speak of synergies. He speaks of an “assault on Italian savings.” He does not speak of integration. He speaks of dispersion of skills and transfer of the center of gravity to Milan.
Behind the formula of protecting Siena there is therefore also a criticism of the idea of a northern financial centralization. And the political reference is hardly equivocal.
THE JABS AT “PADANIA”
At one point Caltagirone explains why he invested in Mps. And he does it using words that have an almost geopolitical flavor. “Under Padania,” he says, “lives 55% of the Italian population and there is only one big bank: Mps. I thought that through its development it would be possible to create a pole in central and southern Italy that would rebalance the current situation.”
“Padania” is certainly not a neutral word. It is a hardline denomination of a territorial Lega pre-existing Salvini. That imaginary geographical denomination, inserted within a reflection on Italian banking balances, inevitably takes on a political meaning.
It is here that the break with Banco Bpm takes on a different dimension: no longer a simple clash between shareholders, but a conflict between models.
THE BREAK WITH LOVAGLIO
From Caltagirone’s words, the king is naked also on the reasons for the clash with Luigi Lovaglio. More than governance, the real breaking point seems to be what Mediobanca should become and whether it makes sense to question the weight of Generali inside Piazzetta Cuccia. On this, the Roman entrepreneur finally reveals his cards.
It is true that “Lovaglio has been an optimizer, he cut costs, reduced staff,” he had the “courage to do unpopular parts,” Caltagirone acknowledges. “A muscle-relaxing work inside the company.” But, and here we get to the point, “there is no man for all seasons.”
It is no coincidence that Caltagirone openly relaunches the idea of a more autonomous Mediobanca. And it is within this vision that the defense of the link with the Lion also fits. And indeed he says: “Should Mediobanca keep 13% of Generali? I think so.”
These are among the nodes of the almost astronomical distance matured with Lovaglio. For the manager, Piazzetta Cuccia must be absorbed into Siena as much as possible, even with delisting, while Generali is “nice to have,” an appealing asset, and therefore even marketable.
“Caltagirone has a different idea. “If I sell Generali and then reinvest in something that consumes more capital and yields less, I don’t see the logic.” For the Roman entrepreneur the stake in the Lion is not a disposable asset, but a strategic stronghold to maintain within Mediobanca’s balance. Immediately after he adds: “Selling to raise cash is not a strategy. If I sell an activity that gives me stable income, I have to explain what I buy better.”
In the end, this is what Caltagirone tries to communicate: his banking battles go beyond mere financial return. “At a certain point in life you no longer do things only for profit but also for a general interest,” he says. And it is within this framework that he asks to read his moves on Mps, Mediobanca, and Generali.
