There is a “risk of dollarization of the world and the European Union.” The alarm was raised by Giovanni Crosetto, MEP for Brothers of Italy and nephew of Minister Guido Crosetto, who spoke yesterday at the European Parliament during the conference “The digital euro: a political and strategic choice for the EU,” organized by the Italian Banking Association. A moment that clearly marks the paradigm shift: the digital euro is no longer a matter for technicians and central bankers, but a field of political, industrial, and geopolitical debate.
THE GEOPOLITICAL PUSH (AND THE TRUMP EFFECT)
Until a few months ago, the dossier was moving slowly, hindered by political divisions and resistance from the banking sector; today the picture has changed. And not by little. The international context, particularly Donald Trump’s return to the White House with a strategy openly favorable to dollar stablecoins and hostile to public digital currencies, has also acted as an accelerator.
The two issues are intertwined: dependence on private circuits and the rise of dollar stablecoins, which risk pushing American hegemony in payments even further.
The result is a systemic risk: not only technological or financial, but geopolitical.
THE REAL PROBLEM: THE PRIVATIZATION OF PAYMENTS
Even before cryptocurrencies, the issue is daily payments. “The privatization of digital payments,” says Crosetto. “Two-thirds of our payments are made via credit cards” and these services are “provided for the vast majority by American providers.”
This data is confirmed by multiple sources: in the Eurozone about two-thirds of card transactions go through non-European operators and in 13 countries the dependence is total. It is not only an economic problem but one of infrastructure control.
THE ABI CONFERENCE AND THE (ALMOST TOTAL) ITALIAN CONVERGENCE
The conference organized by ABI in Brussels captures this phase change. Representatives from the ECB, Bank of Italy, European Commission, ABI, and the main European political families gathered in the European Parliament hall.
But the most relevant fact is political: the presence of almost all Italian parties, from right to left. Five Star Movement, Democratic Party, Forza Italia, Brothers of Italy, Action, AVS. All on the same line.
All, except the League. An absence that appears far from marginal and could open a political issue even within the majority.
In the mosaic forming in Brussels, roles are not identical but the direction is common. Crosetto, member of the ECON committee, brings the position of the European Conservatives into the heart of the negotiation. Then there is Pasquale Tridico’s role: the former INPS president, now M5S delegation leader, is shadow rapporteur on the dossier.
When Tridico talks about the digital euro as “strengthening the EU’s autonomous strategy” and as a tool to “oppose the dominance of Visa and Mastercard,” he does so not only as an observer but as a protagonist in the legislative process.
The same arguments reappear, with different nuances, also in the center-right interventions. Marco Falcone, MEP for Forza Italia, speaks of the digital euro as the “currency of the European future,” capable of strengthening monetary sovereignty and at the same time generating concrete benefits: “cost reduction” and greater ease in payments.
The convergence is built precisely on this dual track: strategic autonomy and economic advantages. Two dimensions that, in the European debate, are increasingly going hand in hand.
THE EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE
It is no coincidence that the rapporteur of the measure, the Spaniard Fernando Navarrete (EPP), openly spoke of a changed climate. According to Navarrete, “among the various political groups a convergence is emerging on the central elements” of the digital euro, particularly on the role of service providers and payment architecture.
The point now is different. “The question is no longer whether to make the digital euro or not, but how to make it and how to do it well,” said Tridico, summarizing the dossier’s phase change.
ECB, BANK OF ITALY AND ABI: WHO THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY SAY
The technical-institutional front is moving just as cohesively, albeit with some caution, as emerges from a report by Sole 24 Ore.
Alessandro Giovannini, economist at the European Central Bank involved in the digital euro program, brought the discussion to a very concrete level: the possibility of choosing how to pay. In a context where “two-thirds of transactions depend on only two actors,” he explained, the risk is that this freedom will progressively diminish. The digital euro would serve precisely to “preserve the freedom of choice” in payment methods.
From the Italian side, Marco Pieroni, head of the digital euro unit at the Bank of Italy and a key figure in coordinating the project nationally and at the European level, emphasized Italy’s industrial role. Not only participation in the platform’s development but also infrastructure: if the project is approved, “there will be three dedicated data centers in Italy.”
The position of the Italian Banking Association is more nuanced. Rita Camporeale, head of ABI’s payment systems, urges avoiding unwanted effects. On the one hand, she recalled, “private money cannot solve sovereignty issues,” on the other hand, it is necessary to avoid the new system “creating a new dependence on extra-EU actors,” perhaps through global platforms capable of distributing digital wallets.
In this perspective, Camporeale also suggested the need for “a legal anchor” allowing banks to freely participate in the pilot test planned by the ECB, clarifying the operational perimeter of their involvement.
FEES, COSTS AND THE ECONOMIC MODEL
While political convergence is now broad, the most delicate ground remains economic. The real clash concerns fees.
Today electronic payments involve costs up to 1.3% for credit cards, with a significant impact on businesses and merchants. Only the Italian restaurant sector bears estimated costs between 500 and 600 million euros per year.
It is therefore not surprising that many associations push to eliminate or drastically reduce fees with the digital euro, at least in the initial phase. This is the point on which the real spread of the instrument depends.
RESISTANCES (AND THE GERMAN CASE)
Resistances, especially in Northern Europe, have not completely disappeared. In Germany, local banks have contested the project fearing adaptation costs up to 30 billion euros and a significant loss of deposits.
The fear is that of banking disintermediation and the ECB becoming a direct operator. However, the European compromise – with holding limits and a central role for intermediaries – seems to have eased tensions.
THE CALENDAR: VOTE, TRILOGUE AND PILOT PHASE
On the legislative front, the calendar now seems defined. The vote in the ECON committee is expected on June 23, with final approval in plenary in July. The goal is to reach the trilogue – that is, the negotiation between the European Parliament, Council, and Commission – and close the regulation by the end of the year, as hoped yesterday by Kyriakos Pierrakakis, president of the Eurogroup.
If this happens, the ECB can start the pilot program in the second half of 2027. A crucial phase to test the infrastructure before a possible launch between 2028 and 2029.
DIGITAL EURO, BEYOND THE CURRENCY: COMMON DEBT, STABLECOINS AND CAPITAL MARKETS
However, there remains a deeper issue that runs through the entire European debate and goes far beyond the technical perimeter of digital currency. The point is common debt, but not only that: there is also the absence of a true European financial ecosystem capable of supporting the international role of the euro.
Without a European public debt security, it is difficult even to imagine a credible European stablecoin. Today over 90% of stablecoins are denominated in dollars and rest on US financial assets. This is not a technical detail, but a reflection of the depth of American markets and the global role of the dollar, which accounts for about 60% of world reserves compared to just over 20% for the euro.
It is here that the digital euro discussion intertwines with other dossiers: the union of capital markets, the creation of safe European assets, the strengthening of financial supply in euros. Without these elements, the risk is that capital, data, and infrastructures will continue to gravitate around the United States.
As also highlighted by Startmag, the payments game is only the tip of the iceberg. Beneath it lies a question of strategic autonomy concerning the entire European economic system. In this framework, the digital euro becomes a tool, not the goal.
