The Sigonella case reopens the issue of US bases.
The Italian refusal to use the Sicilian base opens a new front of reflection in the relations between Rome and Washington. The decision of Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, made after discovering an American flight plan communicated during an operation already in progress, brings back to the center the issue of national sovereignty over military bases and the operational limits of allies in light of the rules of engagement and international agreements.
An episode that, amid tensions in the Middle East, raises broader questions not only about Italy’s role but also and above all about the European posture and the balances within the Atlantic Alliance.
Start Magazine discussed this with General Leonardo Tricarico, president of the Icsa Foundation, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
General, Italy’s refusal to allow the United States to use the Sigonella base represents a decisive moment. Is this an isolated episode or a broader signal of a redefinition of relations between Italy and its historic transatlantic ally?
“I would say it is a signal, whose isolation should only be interpreted in relation to other European countries. Except for Spain, it seems once again that the absence of Europe as such should be emphasized or even that there was an apparently European position, very apparently European, that of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, who the other day rebuked US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. It is unclear whether this was with the unanimous consent of the member states, with rather coarse words, but in any case with direct accusations. I do not know if an effort was made to do something that really should be done, namely to put together a common European vision regarding this war that is risking to destabilize the balances of the Middle East and globally.”
In your opinion, are we facing a new Sigonella case like the one on October 11, 1985, during Bettino Craxi’s time?
“President Craxi had to intervene retrospectively, when an illegal act had already been committed and was about to continue. In this case, I do not know if our government received a request to use the base, but whether it did or not, this is a preventive intervention.”
From what has emerged from press reconstructions, the American flights were not part of the logistical activities provided for by the agreements. Can you clarify what the rules of engagement are for military bases like Sigonella and what distinguishes an authorized flight from one that requires explicit political clearance?
“I do not know which flights were carried out. I can say that there are rules that must be followed. These rules date back to the 1950s; from these fundamental principles, a regulation was derived that has come to define in detail, base by base, what the norms should be, observed by the host countries, which it is never enough to emphasize are hosts. These are in fact Italian bases, granted for use, and those who use them are to be considered guests. There is a fundamental principle to which the norms conform – both those from the 1950s, the NATO SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) norm, and those derived – and that is that all activities carried out on these bases must be framed within the NATO context. Outside of this context, explicit authorization from the Italian government must always be requested.”
As you mentioned earlier, Spain has taken a decidedly firmer step, closing not only the bases but also its airspace and flights related to the operation in Iran. Do you think we are witnessing a change in Europe’s posture towards American operations?
“We have not understood what posture Europe has. I believe that the choice to entrust the responsibility of European foreign policy to a representative of a Baltic country, and to do the same for the European Commissioner for Defense, also from the same area, has determined a sensitivity – perhaps excessive – towards the Russo-Ukrainian war and the northern front. The same cannot be said, however, regarding their attention and strategic vision on the southern front, which is what we are talking about. Therefore, it is desirable that as soon as possible, if Europe wants to show vitality, it develops, if possible, a common vision among European countries regarding the ongoing conflict and what could prospectively irreversibly destabilize international balances.”
So, in conclusion, is there a risk of a political fracture within the Atlantic Alliance?
“At this moment, NATO can only be spoken of if Turkey decides to invoke Article 5, as it is attacked by a hostile country, presumably Iran, which has already on several occasions launched missiles intercepted by the Alliance’s system. In all other cases, it is not possible to speak of NATO because its founding principle is to be a defensive alliance. The operation that Israel and the United States are conducting against Iran and neighboring countries cannot be classified as a defensive operation. The Alliance therefore follows its own path, has well-defined rules and scopes, and can interact with what is happening only to the extent that a member state – like Turkey – is subject to an attack. At the moment, however, Ankara has not shown any intention to avail itself of this option.”
