What real room does Rome have to support Gulf partners? And what role can Europe play in a scenario of military escalation and increasing missile threats? Does the Unifil mission in Lebanon still make sense? We asked General Leonardo Tricarico, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, to analyze the risks, operational capabilities, and limits of Italy’s commitment to the region’s air defense.
General, how concrete is the missile and drone threat in the Mediterranean region today?
I would say the missile threat is very close to zero, because the range of Iranian armaments should not allow them to reach national territory. The distance is so long, there would be good hopes that someone, including us, could intercept missiles before they cause damage. Also regarding drones, with 2,500 kilometers to cover, I don’t understand why Iran would put Italy among the targets when there are more rewarding ones. I wouldn’t worry much from this point of view.
Considering the proliferation of UAVs and unmanned drones in Middle Eastern theaters, what systems could Italy deploy in the short term and, concretely, what anti-missile and anti-drone systems is Italy able to send today without weakening its own defense?
Without weakening defense, we cannot deploy anything, as Defense Minister Crosetto also reiterated. It is our concern to be able to defend Italian airspace and it has always been so in recent years. The expectations and initiatives of those who presented programs and projects have been disappointed because the programs have been systematically rejected due to budget issues. In summary, we have something to give, but in doing so we would weaken an already exhausted force.
Considering that SAMP/T systems have already been used in the war in Ukraine, how sustainable is it for Rome to continue providing military support on multiple fronts simultaneously?
Of course, we have some prized supports and some less prized, and perhaps less necessary. Among the prized ones, I would definitely include those we have already given to Ukraine, namely tools to help maintain sovereignty in the airspace. We are very well organized and I believe the Italian contribution has undoubtedly been very important and highly appreciated also by the EPO. And we must continue with that, no doubt. All other systems will need to be evaluated very carefully because our stockpiles are highly deficient and whatever we give, we deprive ourselves of. That said, I have no doubts regarding aid to Ukraine, and I am convinced that one day there will be a negotiating table: we must allow them to go to the next hoped-for meetings with their heads held high.
In Italy, which military bases are best equipped for possible involvement in case of an explicit request from the United States?
All of them. Each has its functions, so it depends on what they need. The best equipped are certainly Aviano and Sigonella.
In a scenario of escalation with Iran, what role could Europe play in building a regional air defense shield and how realistic is rapid European coordination?
From my point of view, Europe is a term that should no longer be used. There are individual countries that, despite having consultation hubs, cannot develop a common vision. Talking about a shield when there is no coalition capable of designing and activating it is absolutely inappropriate. Today it would be difficult to manage a mission at the European level; it would make more sense to talk about NATO. If Europe were to decide to create a shield to protect the countries in the area, it would make sense to discuss it with NATO.
(Excerpt from an interview published by Policy Maker)
