In early May, at Fort Hood, Texas, soldiers of the “Black Jack” brigade ceremonially rolled up and stored their unit’s flags as the 4,000 men of the armored unit prepared to deploy to Poland. Their mission was to help defend NATO from the Russian threat. “When a combat armored brigade deploys to the front line, it sends a clear and unequivocal signal,” said General Thomas Feltey, division commander, during the ceremony. Less than two weeks later, America sent the opposite signal: the deployment was canceled. This is the second time this month that Donald Trump has announced cuts to the American military presence in Europe – writes The Economist.
Previously, he had declared that he would withdraw 5,000 soldiers from Germany and others from other areas, reflecting his anger over the lack of European support for his war in Iran.
Trump began to question his commitment to NATO and the mutual defense clause of Article 5 from the start of his second term. This prompted a long-awaited increase in European defense spending. However, in recent months he has gone further, announcing unexpected troop reductions and canceling the deployment to Germany of a cruise missile unit that was supposed to fill a significant gap in European defense. The rapid disengagement has overturned Europeans’ belief that they had enough time to strengthen their forces and replace vital American “enablers,” such as intelligence and surveillance systems. America’s massive missile consumption in Iran is delaying shipments to European allies and Ukraine as the country replenishes its stocks.
Within NATO, some – shocked by Trump’s January threat to take Greenland away from Denmark – fear not only that America might stand by in the event of war with Russia but that it might actively hinder responses from other members. This possibility is considered remote. However, interviews with senior officers and defense officials from several NATO countries reveal for the first time how seriously this risk is taken. Some European armed forces are developing secret plans to fight not only without America’s help but without much of NATO’s command and control infrastructure. “The Greenland crisis was a wake-up call,” says a Swedish defense official. “We realized we need a Plan B.”
None of the officials interviewed wanted to make official statements, fearing that doing so might accelerate America’s departure. Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General, “literally forbade talking about it because he believes it could pour fuel on the fire,” says an insider source. When last year Matti Pesu of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) co-authored a paper advocating the need for a Plan B, Finnish officials denied that one was being considered. But the urgency of the threat has pushed several countries to start thinking about how, and under whose command, Europe would fight if NATO were to “break down,” to use a phrase from an official. “What chain of command can be used if America blocks NATO?” asks another defense official.
The question strikes at the heart of the alliance’s success. Most military coalitions resemble elementary school music rehearsals: each country shows up, plays its drum more or less in time with the others, and leaves. NATO, by contrast, was conceived as a symphony orchestra controlled by a single conductor, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), an American general who also commands U.S. forces in Europe. To conduct this orchestra, SACEUR has secure communication links with a network of permanent subordinate headquarters, staffed with thousands of people ready to respond as soon as war breaks out. “U.S. leadership is the glue that holds the alliance together,” says Luis Simón, director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Free University of Brussels. “Without them, we would probably see a fragmentation of the deterrence ecosystem.”
Therefore, a Plan B requires more than just buying weapons; it means creating a structure under which Europeans can fight. The core, at least in Northern Europe, would likely be a coalition of Baltic and Nordic countries, plus Poland. These countries mostly share common values and all fear Russia. Several larger European NATO members, such as Britain, France, and Germany, have tripwire forces in the Baltic countries and are thus highly likely to be drawn into any conflict. About a third of NATO members “would fight from day one” regardless of whether Article 5 is activated, says Edward Arnold of RUSI, a London think tank. “No one would wait for the Portuguese at the North Atlantic Council [NATO’s highest decision-making body] to discuss,” he explains.
An alternative command structure often cited is the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a UK-led coalition of ten countries, mostly Baltic and Nordic, with a permanent headquarters near London. Established by Britain and six other NATO members in 2014, the JEF was originally seen as a complement to the main body, capable of providing high-readiness forces at short notice for circumstances that did not meet the Article 5 threshold. Its competencies expanded when Sweden and Finland joined the coalition in 2017, several years before applying for NATO membership. It is now seen as a way to circumvent one of NATO’s weaknesses: any member can block the activation of Article 5, which requires unanimous decision. The JEF, as its then-commander, British Major General Jim Morris, stated in 2023, “can respond to situations on a non-consent basis.” It has already been activated several times for exercises and naval patrols.
“The JEF is the most structured among the alternatives,” says Arnold. Its headquarters already has capabilities in intelligence, planning, and logistics. It has its own secure communication networks which, although limited, do not depend on NATO. Britain’s membership provides a certain degree of nuclear deterrence.
However, the JEF’s focus remains mainly on the Nordic and Baltic regions. It lacks major powers like France, Germany, and Poland. Some allied officials are concerned about Britain’s defense readiness: funding cuts have left it with few ships, submarines, and army units ready for rapid deployment. “England is everyone’s favorite uncle,” says one official. “But it suffers from Downton Abbey syndrome. It keeps up appearances but lacks the funds.”
Such problems could be mitigated if the group welcomed Germany, which is greatly increasing its defense budget. Despite all its drawbacks, the JEF seems the best solution if European members cannot take on NATO’s current structure. In any case, Europe will find some form of common defense structure to replace the Americans. Deterrence based on someone who might not show up is no deterrence at all.
(Excerpt from the foreign press review by Epr Comunicazione)
