Is Ursula von der Leyen capable of managing more than one emergency at a time? The Commission President decided to cancel the strategic debate she had scheduled for Monday, April 13, with the college of commissioners on China and replaced it with a discussion on the situation in the Middle East and its broader impact on Europe. “It will be an opportunity for the college to jointly assess all the activities the Commission is carrying out to address the current situation, from energy to transport, migration to internal security, and all the policy areas affected by this conflict,” the Commission spokesperson said yesterday. The challenge posed by China can wait. The strategic debate on how to address Chinese threats “has been postponed and we will inform you of a new date as soon as it is set,” the spokesperson explained.
Donald Trump’s war in Iran has caused enormous immediate damage to the EU and its Member States. The surge in energy prices raises the risk of stagflation. At the start of the conflict, instead of focusing on the response the Commission could provide based on its competences, von der Leyen had taken upon herself the role that belongs to Antonio Costa and Kaja Kallas to lead the EU’s foreign policy. In the early days of the war, she supported Trump’s goal of regime change in Iran and multiplied contacts with Gulf and Middle Eastern leaders. After a controversial speech in which von der Leyen supported the need to disregard international law, the Commission President was called to order. Costa and Kallas regained the upper hand in managing international relations on the war in Iran. And von der Leyen’s sense of urgency disappeared.
Almost seven weeks have passed since the first American-Israeli bombs and the Islamic Republic’s attacks against Gulf countries. Three weeks have passed since a European Council where leaders tasked the Commission to present proposals “without delay” to address the energy crisis. Due to the Easter break, von der Leyen did not find it useful to convene the college of commissioners on either April 1 or April 8. Beyond the strategic debate on China – now canceled and replaced by the Middle East – the resumption of Commission meetings was scheduled for April 28. Since her trip to Australia at the end of March, von der Leyen’s official agenda has remained empty. In April, her social media accounted for three activities: a phone call with Keir Starmer, a speech to receive an award in Hanover, and Easter greetings holding a chick via a mini-video on Instagram.
Will the package requested by the European Council to respond to the energy crisis be announced at Monday’s college of commissioners meeting? Perhaps. But don’t expect anything original to protect citizens and businesses, as parliamentary groups demand, nor major efforts to push Member States to reduce energy demand in a coordinated way, as many experts advocate. The “toolbox” should be limited to recommending lower tax rates on electricity to ensure it is taxed less than fossil fuels, measures for network infrastructure, and modernization of the ETS.
Facing the shortage of liquefied natural gas caused by the war, the think tank Bruegel suggested an alliance between the EU, Japan, and South Korea – which together purchase about 60 percent of global LNG – to coordinate efforts and avoid competing with each other. Has anyone from the Commission called Tokyo and Seoul? Publicly, this is unknown.
Instead of canceling the debate on China, for the energy “toolbox” von der Leyen could have convened her Commission on Wednesday, April 15, or the following week. In an era of polycrisis, there are many urgencies to address. Among other things, at the European Council on March 19, von der Leyen had promised to present the “One Europe, One Market” roadmap to define “the main legislative measures with a timeline, objectives, and well-defined milestones to be achieved by the end of 2027” on the internal market. The roadmap “must be approved by the Council, the European Parliament, and the Commission, and we intend to sign and present it at the informal summit in Cyprus in April,” von der Leyen said. The informal summit in Cyprus will be held on April 23 and 24. The roadmap has not yet materialized. It is hard to imagine how Parliament could sign it, given that it will not meet before the end of April.
The list of things to do for the Commission is long. Another example is enlargement. While waiting for the elections in Hungary to determine the end or continuation of Viktor Orban and his veto on opening negotiation chapters for Ukraine, the EU could work on the internal reforms necessary to welcome new members. Montenegro could join in 2028, Albania in 2029. The Commission was supposed to present its proposals for internal reforms in November. Instead, nothing. The December European Council again invited the Commission “to present” its proposals to “advance the work in parallel.” Again, nothing. A Commission source explained to us that, without prior general consensus among Member States on the main internal reforms for enlargement, von der Leyen will not move. “If all goes well, the proposals will be presented in summer,” the source told us.
It is not only a matter of dates but also of method and governance. In her second term, von der Leyen has further emphasized her centralized and vertical governance method of the Commission. Before being approved by the college, everything must be analyzed, filtered, and possibly rewritten by the President’s cabinet. The recommendations from Mario Draghi’s and Enrico Letta’s reports have materialized only partially and with enormous delay. Important initiatives – such as the Industrial Accelerator Act that introduced Made in Europe – have been postponed multiple times. Proposals announced as imminent – such as the revision of benchmarks for free allowances under the ETS emissions trading system – have accumulated delays.
“Von der Leyen manages one dossier at a time and one crisis at a time,” another internal Commission source explained to us. The institution’s traditional working method has been overturned: directorates-general execute orders from the President’s cabinet instead of feeding proposals to the college.
Von der Leyen’s decision to cancel and postpone the Commission’s strategic debate on China does not make the Chinese emergency less urgent. According to Eurostat data, the EU’s trade deficit with China further widened in 2025, rising to 360 billion euros from 304 billion in 2024. China’s exports to the EU grew by 6.3 percent. The EU’s exports to China fell by 6.5 percent. These are no longer low-cost products but cars, technology, chemicals – all sectors in which China has overcapacity. “It is useless for the Commission to talk so much about re-industrializing the EU if the main factor of de-industrialization, namely China, is not addressed,” a representative of a business organization told us.
The Commission defends itself by arguing that many initiatives adopted in recent years are directed against China: tariffs on electric vehicles, steel tariffs, “Made in Europe,” trade agreements with India and Australia. “Even though there hasn’t been a structured debate at the college level on China, China is obviously part of the discussions regularly as seen from various political initiatives,” the spokesperson explained yesterday.
EU policy on China dates back to 2019 when, under Jean-Claude Juncker, the Commission defined it as “partner, competitor, and systemic rival.” Von der Leyen provided her update in 2023, when Joe Biden was still in the White House, with the “de-risking” speech from China. In light of the trade deficit and Beijing’s aggressiveness, think tanks and experts believe the EU should respond more forcefully, using its levers, such as the anti-coercion instrument. It is up to the Commission to decide whether to do so. A strategic debate among commissioners would be useful. “We will find a new date for this important discussion soon. So, from this point of view, there is no need to worry,” the Commission spokesperson said.
(Extracted from the Mattinale Europeo)
