After weeks of open war, we are facing a fragile and seemingly sudden truce. But is it really over or is it just a tactical pause? In this interview, Professor Mario Del Pero, a professor of International History at SciencesPo, analyzes what has really changed in these days: a conflict that was supposed to be quick has instead revealed the vulnerabilities of all actors involved. Iran has shown it can extend the costs of war far beyond its borders, the United States emerges weaker than expected in a delicate election year, while China – silent but decisive – has worked behind the scenes to restore stability, because chaos in the Gulf directly threatens its strategic and energy interests. The result is a narrow and uncertain window of opportunity: useful to understand whether a different balance can emerge from this crisis or if in a few days we will return to square one.
Professor, have hostilities really ceased or will everything start again in two weeks?
I would speak of a window of opportunity that has opened, an opportunity for the costs of the conflict to become evident to all parties involved.
Is Iran coming out badly damaged?
Iran seems to come out better, because it has shown it has tools to spread the costs of the conflict regionally and globally. It did so by having an asset that the war created, which is blocking Hormuz, something it had never done before. Today we are negotiating the restoration of a condition that did not exist before the war.
Of course, Tehran has taken some hits as well.
Certainly. Iran has seen its industrial and infrastructural network devastated and its leadership decapitated. Not even its current leaders are safe, quite the opposite; anyone with a position of power or a central role in the command hierarchy is an easily identifiable and eliminable target by the United States or Israel.
And America? How does it come out of this war?
Trump’s America comes out of this war weakened. The one that started on February 28 was supposed to be a relatively simple war. It was supposed to be a war in which the decapitation of the Iranian leadership would have induced future Iran to align itself or, let’s say, to give up playing a central role in the region or threatening other countries. This did not happen mainly because, as I said before, the socialization of the costs of the war showed the vulnerability of the United States.
The oil issue was also fundamental.
Indeed: we are talking about the famous gallon of gasoline which in the US political imagination has such power that no other price does when it exceeds four dollars. Not to mention when food prices reach the levels they have reached. This made America very vulnerable in a crucial election year. Moreover, the Federal Reserve does not foresee interest rate hikes. And politically and electorally you become the main victim of this. In short, the sufferings of the war created the risk that its continuation could impose unacceptable costs for Trump.
What do you think of the mediation carried out by Pakistan and especially China?
China played a fundamentally indirect role, and Pakistan is a historic ally of China. The Pakistani mediation certainly had many Chinese inputs and it is believed that the Iranian regime was pushed to accept this temporary agreement due to Chinese pressures.
So the credit for this truce goes mainly to Beijing?
China certainly played a behind-the-scenes role and I believe it did so because China is a country that has an interest and a policy oriented towards preserving stability, which allows China to grow and carry out its preferred economic policies. Beijing primarily wants to extend its global influence, so it is a country oriented towards stability. Beijing could only have suffered disadvantages from this conflict.
What kind of disadvantages are we talking about?
First of all, those deriving from its dependence on Gulf oil. If its price goes off the scale, Beijing certainly has the tools and is better equipped than anyone else to defend itself from these turbulences and come out not diminished. Judging by the proportions this conflict had taken, I believe Beijing realized that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. Moreover, the war had made relations with Gulf countries, with which China has very close ties, more difficult.
Give us an example.
Let us not forget that it was China that mediated the détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia three years ago with a historic meeting in Beijing. That’s not all: China has significant investments in the United Arab Emirates. In short, China has specific regional interests but above all the broader interest in a stability that was clearly threatened by what was happening. For this reason, China played its hand.
In one way or another, energy is always involved.
Certainly. China was exposed to a serious vulnerability, just look at how volatile oil prices and their derivatives have been. Precisely this volatility made Beijing push for a return to normality, and in this it had strong incentives obviously linked to energy resources: we could talk about a strategic geopolitical incentive, which is the other side of the Green revolution that sees Beijing at the forefront in the fight against climate change. China has every interest in becoming less dependent on fossil fuels, but for the moment it cannot give them up: everything we have witnessed and the rapid return to normality that Beijing has encouraged demonstrate this. So China will work to ensure that the truce leads to lasting peace. Beijing has every interest in this window not being short, because then the effects of the war would reverberate on the stability that is an essential condition for the growth pursued by Beijing. Personally, however, I fear that it will still take a long time to see normality again
