It took an alternative center-right proposal to put to rest sixteen years of Orbanism, the “paprika sovereignism.” The little left still present in the Hungarian political scene disappears, and the new parliament is composed exclusively of forces linked to the right: the moderate right of Tisza and the winner Peter Magyar, placed in Europe within the EPP alliance, the nationalist right of the defeated Viktor Orban and Fidesz, and the extreme right of Mi Hazank. Post-Orban Hungary thus finds itself entirely shifted to the right and lacking parliamentary left-wing representation, outlining for the coming years a setup similar to the Polish one, based on competition between liberal-conservative right and nationalist right.
A PARLIAMENT ALL ON THE RIGHT
Magyar led his formation to a result of 53% of the vote, securing a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly (Orszaggyules) with 138 seats out of 199. Orban’s party instead stopped at 38%, a share not seen for almost thirty years. The elections took on the contours of a true referendum on the outgoing prime minister, mobilizing the electorate as rarely happened before: turnout reached 79.5%, the highest level since the 1989 turning point, with peaks in urban areas traditionally favorable to the opposition, such as the capital Budapest, where 83% of eligible voters cast their ballots.
THE WEIGHT OF THE ECONOMY IN THE DEFEAT
The comparison with Poland stops, however, at the political level. At the base of Orban’s defeat is above all Hungary’s economic slowdown, in contrast with the sustained growth recorded by Warsaw in recent years under any government, whether liberal or nationalist.
Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign motto – “It’s the economy, stupid” – found further confirmation here. Beyond ideological contrasts, it is indeed in the Hungarians’ wallets that the loss of consensus of the outgoing government took place. A study by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (Wiiw) highlighted a seven-percentage-point gap in GDP growth compared to the Central Eastern European average. From being a leading country in the region, Budapest progressively lost ground, also due to “a model characterized by strong public intervention, selective taxation, and support for a national entrepreneurial class, with effects on the deterioration of the institutional context.”
Between 2009 and 2024, there was also a relative decline in per capita GDP, despite a partial convergence with Western Europe, occurring at a slower pace than other countries in the area.
THE AMBIGUITIES OF FOREIGN POLICY
The international orientation followed by Orban in recent years also influenced the electoral result, marked by an alternation between maintaining relations with Vladimir Putin and approaching the US political area linked to Donald Trump. The dialogue with Moscow fueled distrust in public opinion, reactivated also in this electoral campaign that fell in the year of the seventieth anniversary of the 1956 Budapest uprising.
At the same time, relations with the Trumpian environment did not produce evident benefits: visits by US representatives were perceived as interference, while the traditional perception of protection from the United States faded.
The progressive distancing from the European Union also had tangible consequences, with concrete economic repercussions: the significant reduction of European funds deprived Hungary of relevant resources, particularly those intended to support the ecological and digital transition.
THE RAPID RISE OF MAGYAR
Emerging on the political scene only at the beginning of 2024, Magyar quickly established himself as a protagonist, attracting attention also at the European level when his Tisza movement nearly reached 30% in the European elections in June of that year. At 45 years old, the jurist, with limited experience in the European Parliament, is now preparing to lead the country.
His success matured through a campaign focused on the population’s concrete problems, cleverly avoiding ideological clashes (thus taking away much of Orban’s rhetorical cards) and managing to reunify a traditionally fragmented opposition. The widespread presence on the territory, extended even to Fidesz strongholds, and his past within the Orban power system allowed him to intercept part of the disappointed electorate. The break with the governing party, which occurred in 2024 after a scandal, marked the start of a political line focused on denouncing corruption and nepotism, themes that found resonance even among some establishment supporters.
THE UNCERTAINTIES OF THE NEW PHASE
However, the new phase opens with several uncertainties. The confrontation with the institutional apparatus built over the years by Orban, still guarded by figures close to him, promises to be complex. Although having a qualified majority that allows interventions on the regulatory framework, the transformation process will require time. Questions also remain about the actual European orientation of the new government, also in light of differing positions within its own party, particularly regarding support for Ukraine.
The change of direction appears clear, however, with a line openly oriented towards Europe: “More West, less East” was one of the winning slogans of his electoral campaign. It remains to be seen the solidity of political consensus in a phase that will require quick decisions: possible difficulties could fuel discontent and reopen spaces for a return to power of Fidesz and perhaps Orban himself, in a dynamic reminiscent of precedents already observed in other Central European contexts. The trajectory of Jaroslaw Kaczynski in Poland should at least inspire caution in declaring the end of some political careers.
