The Iran that emerges after the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is no longer the same as before. For over thirty years, the old supreme leader had concentrated every major decision in his own hands: war and peace, relations with the United States, nuclear strategy, key appointments. Everything went through him.
Today, however, his son Mojtaba, appointed the third Supreme Leader last March, is an almost invisible figure, injured and forced to live in the shadows. He does not appear in public, does not speak, and his directives reach the system through slow and precarious channels.
In his place, a new center of power has taken shape, more collective and decidedly more military. It is the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, men with decades of field experience and very close personal ties to Mojtaba, who now lead strategic choices on security, military operations, and international negotiations.
The Islamic Republic has not collapsed, as some in Washington had hoped, but has transformed into something different: a system where the generals, strong in their internal cohesion and operational capacity, dictate the line with hard and calculated pragmatism.
This emerges from a detailed New York Times investigation, based on dozens of direct sources within the Iranian system, which describes the precarious health conditions of the new leader, the almost artisanal method with which he must communicate, the long-standing ties that bind him to the military leadership, the tensions that have emerged in negotiations with the United States, and the growing weight of a Guards apparatus that no longer just executes orders but takes them personally.
The source and method of the investigation
The New York Times investigation is based on in-depth and risky reporting, conducted in a context of great secrecy.
The journalists collected testimonies from direct and well-informed sources: six high-ranking current Iranian officials, two former officials, two members of the Revolutionary Guards, a senior cleric who knows the internal mechanisms of the system, and three people close to Mojtaba Khamenei. In addition, there are nine other figures linked to the Guards and the government.
All spoke on condition of anonymity, given the sensitivity of the topics. The voices converge on a coherent picture: the new supreme leader does not exercise the absolute power of his father, and key decisions on war, peace, and negotiations are now in the hands of a small group of experienced generals.
An invisible and injured leader
Since Mojtaba was chosen as the new Supreme Leader, no one has seen him in public or heard his voice. He has been hidden since February 28, the day an American-Israeli bombing struck his father’s compound, killing Ali Khamenei, Mojtaba’s wife, and son.
He himself was seriously injured. According to four senior officials monitoring his health, he is mentally lucid and follows state affairs, but the injuries are severe: one leg has been operated on three times and awaits a prosthesis, one hand has undergone surgery and is slowly recovering functionality, while his face and lips bear severe burns that make speaking difficult.
In the future, plastic surgery will also be needed. For this reason, he avoids recording video or audio messages: he does not want to appear weak or vulnerable in his first public speech. He communicates only through written statements, read on television or published online.
Access to him is extremely limited. The Guards commanders and senior officials avoid visiting him to not reveal his location to possible Israeli attacks. Around him are mostly doctors and medical staff. President Masoud Pezeshkian, a cardiac surgeon by profession, and the Minister of Health personally oversee his care.
Messages reach him handwritten, sealed in envelopes and passed hand to hand through trusted couriers traveling on secondary roads, by car or motorcycle. His directives return by the same slow and cautious method.
This combination of security concerns, physical injuries, and logistical difficulties has led Mojtaba to delegate many decisions to the generals, at least for the moment.
The “chairman of the board” and the role of the generals
Abdolreza Davari, former adviser to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and knowledgeable about Mojtaba, uses an effective image: “he manages the country as if he were the chairman of the board. He relies heavily on the advice of board members, and they collectively make all decisions. The generals are the board members.”
Analysts like Sanam Vakil of Chatham House and Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group confirm this power shift. Mojtaba signs or formally approves, but often faces decisions already made: faits accomplis are presented to him ready. He is not yet in full command; the military dominate security, war strategy, and diplomacy.
President Trump spoke of “regime change” and new “more reasonable” leaders. In reality, the Islamic Republic has not fallen. Power has passed to a rooted and uncompromising military apparatus, while the broad influence of the traditional clergy is diminishing. Reformist and ultra factions still participate in political discussions, but the generals dictate the line on war and peace.
The rise of the Revolutionary Guards
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards were born to defend the 1979 revolution. Over time, they have accumulated power: prominent positions in politics, stakes in strategic economic sectors, control of intelligence, and close ties with armed groups in the region hostile to Israel and the United States. Under Ali Khamenei, however, they had to submit to his will as the supreme religious figure and commander-in-chief. He had strengthened them, making them a pillar of his government.
The leader’s death on the first day of the war created a vacuum and an opportunity. The Guards supported Mojtaba in the succession struggle and played a decisive role in his appointment.
Today they control important levers: the commander-in-chief is Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi; the new head of the Supreme National Security Council is General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a former hardliner commander; General Yahya Rahim Safavi remains a top military adviser for father and son.
As Ali Vaez notes, “Mojtaba is not supreme in the way his father was. He is subordinate to the Guards because he owes them his position and the survival of the system.”
The generals see the war as an existential threat to the regime. After five weeks of intense fighting, they believe they have contained the danger. They have led every strategic choice: the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, attacks against Israel and Gulf countries, the temporary ceasefire, reserved diplomatic channels, and direct negotiations with the United States.
For the first time, Revolutionary Guards generals were part of the Iranian delegation that met Vice President JD Vance in Islamabad. President-elect Pezeshkian and his government have been sidelined and invited to deal only with internal affairs: ensuring food, fuel, and the normal functioning of the country.
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who previously led talks with Washington, has been marginalized; Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former Guards general and parliament speaker, has taken the lead.
Personal ties
The weight of the generals derives not only from institutional strength but also from deep human ties with Mojtaba. At seventeen, he volunteered in the Iran-Iraq war and fought in a Guards brigade, the Habib Battalion.
That experience marked him and created lasting friendships. Many comrades later rose to military and intelligence leadership. After seminary studies, where he reached the rank of ayatollah, Mojtaba worked in his father’s compound coordinating military and intelligence operations, further strengthening those relationships.
Among his closest friends are the former head of Guards intelligence, cleric Hossein Taeb, General Mohsen Rezaei, and Ghalibaf himself. For years the three met once a week for extended working lunches in the ayatollah’s compound. They were known as the “power triangle.”
Today these personal relationships mean that Mojtaba and the generals treat each other as equals, not as superior and subordinates. As the New York Times emphasizes, they call each other by first names.
Internal divisions and tensions
Iranian politics has never been monolithic: parallel power structures and often public divisions exist. Even today, Pezeshkian and Araghchi sit on the National Security Council. But under this collective leadership, the generals prevail, and at the moment there are no obvious signs of fractures among them.
A clear example emerged when the Iranian and American delegations were preparing to fly to Islamabad for a second round of talks. The generals blocked everything. For days they had harbored disagreements on how to proceed while Trump maintained the naval blockade: already 27 Iranian ships had been turned away.
Trump’s social media posts, threats to bomb power plants and bridges, and the seizure of two Iranian ships convinced the generals that negotiations were useless and that Washington only wanted surrender.
Pezeshkian and Araghchi held the opposite view: the former warned about economic damage and the need to ease sanctions for reconstruction. There were also discussions on how far to push with the Strait closure.
The generals won and the talks collapsed. Trump extended the ceasefire but maintains the blockade until Iran’s leaders present their own peace proposal.
