The framework agreement between Israelis and Lebanese has obvious implementation challenges, but it starts from one premise: no more state of belligerence, no more armistice, the contracting parties choose to live in peace.
It is the farewell to the Arab Rejection Front, to its culture, the one that said no to Sadat and to the ten-point plan of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which in 1974 started the long path that would later lead to the “two peoples, two states” proposal.
Lebanon was not part of that Front, but its political-cultural legacy has been undeniable.
It is difficult to say what kind of regional peace Lebanon envisions, it reflects on itself and its future because it is not a regional actor. It is a small and devastated country, which today, however, amid enormous difficulties seems to say that the solution to Arab troubles does not pass through armed confrontation, but through the denial of the paradigm that one’s own security is the insecurity of others.
This applies to everyone, but it is not simple.
The leader of the opposition to the agreement, the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and a highly skilled ally of Hezbollah, Nabih Berri, does not exactly return to the rejection front, but says that Lebanon cannot make a separate peace, it must follow the other Arabs, namely Saudi Arabia, since others have already made separate peaces and meanwhile obtain a complete Israeli withdrawal in the armistice perspective, as Iran proposes.
Berri claims that without his votes the agreement would not be ratified by Parliament, but the official counts are different.
What matters in his speech is that everything would shift to the parliamentary level, not the streets, not that “civil war” which no one wants, starting with Hezbollah, which has confirmed that its two ministers will not resign despite disagreeing with the government-backed agreement.
Berri in his statements shows some difficulty speaking about the binding nature of the Arab League line, which commits to an Arab-Israeli peace plan.
The Arab League, a ghost… So what is at stake between the two visions? One can understand by looking at facts and propaganda.
Crucial details
According to the framework agreement, a peace treaty is on the way, a crucial point, while Israel agrees to “progressively” withdraw from Lebanese territories and Lebanon to “progressively” disarm Hezbollah, the Lebanese Khomeinist party that has its own militia, the only armed one in Lebanon.
Gradual Israeli withdrawal without timetables, each reduction of Israeli military presence and then each partial withdrawal will depend on progress in Hezbollah’s disarmament, as indicated by a security annex.
Israel and Lebanon create a Military Coordination Group for Lebanon, responsible for preventing conflict, verifying, and finally implementing the agreements. The Military Group will then report to the two parties.
It is immediately clarified that military operations are entrusted to the Lebanese army. But the phased withdrawal will proceed only if the two parties consider the set objectives achieved: there will be a reduction of Israeli military personnel in Lebanon, then full withdrawal.
The stated objective is to restore full Lebanese sovereignty over the entire national territory, but there are no usual third parties, such as the United States or France, to guarantee the disarmament of militia groups, everything depends on the judgment of the two parties.
It is somewhat the product of Hezbollah’s ambiguities, which in 2024 agreed to disarm in southern Lebanon, then, after a promising start, backtracked and resisted, demanding that Israel also withdraw from all of Lebanon, while maintaining five positions on the borders.
Now the entire south is in ruins, with Lebanon having denounced war crimes.
The Israeli commitment is to withdraw now from two “pilot zones,” a term that in itself would confirm that ultimately there is total withdrawal; the first pilot zone would be near the border, thus with little strategic value, the other further north.
This is the withdrawal that matters to Lebanon, because it would make it more difficult to further extend the occupied area, as happened in the hours preceding the agreement.
Here, in the pilot zones, there will be no weapons or armed Hezbollah members, security is entrusted to the army. But outside these zones, which should become concrete in the coming hours, how will things proceed?
The delicacy of the agreement lies in the mechanism, since occupation and military actions continue, both by Israel and Hezbollah, with constant intensity, while the destruction of southern Lebanon becomes an existential drama.
Hezbollah’s network was very dense, but the refugees without homes are more than a million. Since Beirut was excluded from Israeli targets due to American intervention, many refugees have returned to the south, in extremely difficult conditions.
Therefore, time as always counts, weighs on the durability of peace agreements. The risk is that southern Lebanon disappears before Hezbollah does.
But Hezbollah presents its disarmament as a betrayal and an attempt to deprive Lebanon of one of its protagonists. Really?
What to do with Hezbollah
Without retelling the entire history of Lebanon again, it should be remembered that when Lebanon ended its civil war in 1990, Hezbollah, which had recently been born to fight the Israeli occupation as other groups did, with the support of Iran and Assad’s Syria which occupied the rest of Lebanon, was the only one to obtain an exemption from the disarmament imposed on all militias, because it fought against the occupier, albeit with the support of another occupier.
At that time all other militias were disarmed, including those of Christian parties, Phalangists and Lebanese Forces, which, disarmed, remained protagonists in Lebanese political life. So the same could happen to Hezbollah.
The armed wing is illegal, also in its financial support structures. Does this mean that at that point the “resistance” would be carried out by the army? No. It means that an effective or faster withdrawal would be negotiated with greater authority.
Here comes the second issue. The United States, which mediated this agreement and signed the gradual withdrawal, also signed the Memorandum with Iran that does not speak of phased withdrawal, nor of Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Already at point 1 of that memorandum it reads: “The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran, together with their allies in the current conflict, sign this memorandum of understanding to declare the immediate and definitive cessation of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon, and commit henceforth not to undertake any war or military operation against each other, to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and to guarantee the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.”
The goal is essentially the same as the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, the mode changes: here it speaks of immediate and definitive cessation of military operations. And “definitive” is a clear word.
The question remains why the United States and Iran should talk about peace in Lebanon. Iran asks for this, with its allies, and it is obvious why. Because by discussing it with Iran the United States recognizes Iranian competence.
Iran intends to demonstrate that it has regional influence and chooses Lebanon as a litmus test. But what kind of influence? Political-cultural influence or armed influence? Here the negotiation between the two texts signed by the USA, one with and one without Iran, could be seen.
If Iran obtained funds and agreements on the various “military” chapters enough to feel guaranteed, it could give up its militia outpost, but would ask for political influence over Lebanon, to make visible that it is a regional power, thus with a different institutional arrangement in a country where everything is divided among communities.
In summary, more institutional political weight for the Shiites? Is it imaginable? Hypothetically yes, it depends on the framework that would emerge if there were an agreement and not a new breakdown in negotiations with the United States and the Gulf Arab countries. But fighting in Lebanon to favor this rebalancing process in the Gulf means fighting for Lebanon or fighting for Iran? No one can say today that their “negotiation horizon” is broader than their interest, but this will be seen.
The new security paradigm
The Arab fact is that the rejection front no longer exists: they were secular maximalists, over history they have been replaced by fundamentalist Islamists. Walid Jumblatt, one of the most important Lebanese politicians, asks what kind of peace this is. The very difficult Lebanese card can be used for other purposes by everyone.
But perhaps from Beirut emerges, alongside an age-old problem, also the certainty that peace cannot be based on the paradigm that bases its own security on the insecurity of others, a path that places other unresolved issues and recalls international law.
Just look around, from the security mechanism pursued by Israel to that pursued for decades by Iran to grasp its scope.
At point 13 of the agreement it reads: “Israel and Lebanon commit to adopt measures in good faith reflecting positive intentions, in particular to end all hostile or negative acts in political or international legal forums.” Violations of international law give the Lebanese people the right to seek reparations.
So here we are at the age-old problem: the voice that would come from Beirut to emerge needs itself more than links with external friends, as has always been done since the Ottoman Empire and then French colonialism.
The “national moment” was, all things considered, when everyone together separated, with the National Pact, from French colonialism. It was a beginning, which took place compatibly with the early twentieth-century reality, that is, an understanding between Christians and Muslims. Not little, but today it is no longer enough: it is necessary to be able to tell Lebanese “you are all citizens,” not Shiites, Christians or Sunnis, each with their “trusted friend” outside the country.
If Lebanon managed to begin to be a plural state, it would become a political protagonist on the regional scene. But this must be asked of itself more than others, who obviously are not interested.
(Excerpt from Appunti)
