How do you interpret this leadership change and the non-renewal of Roberto Cingolani, in light of the group’s excellent economic and financial results and the ongoing dossiers outlined in the industrial plan?
Leonardo has certainly made significant progress in terms of orders and turnover. In part, this is common to other European aerospace and defense companies because there has been such an increase in military budgets across Europe since 2022 that many companies have benefited. In Italy, the actual defense budget has increased somewhat less, but the government has invested and there has been a return for Leonardo. The company has launched important partnerships such as Gcap (Global Combat Program) and more.
The point is not so much the result in terms of turnover, which remains positive, but rather the assessment that a manager with deep experience in the defense sector — [Mariani, ed.] — who started working at Leonardo when it was still called Finmeccanica, then moved to Mbda and later returned to Leonardo, and with very thorough knowledge of European military and industrial counterparts (it should not be forgotten that Mbda is a Franco-Italian-German-British consortium), can represent an added value at this historical stage. A phase in which crucial issues for European cooperation are being decided — just think of the dossier on integrated air and missile defense — within a particularly dynamic framework regarding investments and industrial policy choices, both at national and European Union levels.
What do you think about the rumors regarding frictions between manager Cingolani and Palazzo Chigi?
I have no elements to comment on that. In general, however, I believe it is important to keep in mind that regardless of the people in office, there is a balance to be preserved between the choices of the management of a publicly traded company and those of the state as a shareholder of a company central to the armed forces. Management must answer to shareholders and investors and ensure both profitability and a long-term industrial vision. This means investing in production capabilities, human resources, technological research, and maintaining a willingness to take business risks with a broader strategic horizon.
In this context, management, broadly speaking — that is, the CEO, general director, and divisional leadership — plays a central role in a very complex organizational reality like Leonardo. However, it must be remembered that this is not a sector like automotive or other industrial sectors: it is a sector that responds directly to the needs of the armed forces, national security, and the fundamental orientations of Italian foreign and defense policy, orientations which, moreover, show a certain bipartisan continuity within the three traditional circles of Europe, the transatlantic, and the wider Mediterranean. All this inevitably influences some industrial choices.
For example, the decision not to sell to certain buyers or not to start partnerships with counterparts from countries considered hostile — or that have become so over time — is ultimately a political choice. The same applies to balancing the European, transatlantic, and Mediterranean dimensions: for instance, in the current historical phase, there is discussion about the opportunity to further emphasize the European center of gravity, in light of transatlantic tensions and the EU’s new initiatives in the defense field.
We are therefore facing a complex balance that cannot be superficially reduced to personal dynamics. It is a structural fact: Leonardo is at the same time a private company, a state-participated company, and a strategic actor in a sector directly connected to national security, namely aerospace, security, and defense.
Regarding the suggestions that have emerged in recent days about the centrality of the Michelangelo Dome project as a possible focal point of frictions with the government, as it is not favored by the so-called American deep state, what is your interpretation?
In recent days, several superficial or inaccurate comments have circulated, sometimes detached from the facts. On the topic of air and missile defense in Europe, from an operational point of view, NATO remains the reference as the response architecture. At the capability level, however, different national choices coexist: France and Italy have the Samp/T systems; several Central-Eastern European countries use American Patriots; Germany has promoted a joint procurement initiative, the European Sky Shield Initiative, which foresees acquisitions from American, Israeli, and German suppliers; moreover, there is an ongoing European Union initiative on air and missile defense that will likely favor European suppliers.
At the same time, Mbda – a pan-European champion that also includes a British component, and of which Leonardo is the Italian shareholder – continues to develop its systems. In this context, Michelangelo Dome represents a solution still under development, architecturally and technologically, designed to integrate different sensors and interceptors within a single system of systems.
For this reason, I consider it a potential added value for Europe’s defense and not a problematic element in relations with the United States. I do not believe that an American assessment of the relationship with Italy could be based on this, especially in this administration with a president who decides in an absolutely instinctive and centralized way, sidelining institutions that deal technically with dossiers such as air and missile defense in the decision-making process.
Will Mariani follow the strategic line outlined in the industrial plan launched by Cingolani, or should we expect changes? In particular, what impact could this have on the main open dossiers, such as the joint venture with the Saudi fund for Aerostructures, the partnership with Rheinmetall, or the verbal agreement also with Rheinmetall on some Iveco assets?
I think it is normal for a new CEO to want to re-examine the company’s main dossiers and evaluate the industrial plan to see if there is room for modification or improvement. This is even more true in a case like this, where the new CEO knows the defense world and the company itself much better than previous figures coming from sectors outside the field, such as Mauro Moretti from the State Railways or Alessandro Profumo from the financial world.
That said, at the current stage I am not able to say what the concrete orientation of the new CEO will be. However, I believe he has all the tools and experience necessary to develop his own vision on the company’s development relatively quickly. In this sense, his professional background represents an added value: his internal experience in the defense sector, both industrially and in relation to the armed forces, allows him to know very well the reality in which he will have to operate.
