The forced closure of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most strategic passage points in the world, is not just a temporary problem of energy supplies, but a powerful wake-up call for European leaders.
As Cinzia Bianco points out in a new paper by the European Council on Foreign Relations, the shock should force them to urgently and deeply reconsider the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (Imec) project, an ambitious infrastructure conceived in an era of relative stability but which today appears clearly inadequate for a Middle East dominated by the “gray zone” between open war and fragile peace, where maritime chokepoints are systematically turned into geopolitical weapons.
Europe therefore faces the task of redesigning the entire corridor, making it resilient, redundant, and politically sustainable in this new unstable context.
THE IMPACT OF THE HORMUZ CLOSURE
The paralysis of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has generated immediate, dramatic, and varied consequences among the different states in the region.
Kuwait’s oil exports plummeted to zero barrels already in April, while Qatar recorded a vertical collapse of 90% in its flows.
Only a few countries managed to limit the damage thanks to reserve infrastructures developed in the past: the United Arab Emirates relied on the port of Fujairah, directly facing the Sea of Oman, while Saudi Arabia exploited its East-West pipeline to channel crude oil to terminals on the Red Sea.
These same Saudi terminals also allowed bypassing the second major bottleneck, Bab al-Mandab, made practically impassable by attacks from Yemeni Houthis carried out between 2023 and 2025.
The only country that saw its exports increase was Oman, thanks to a combination of favorable factors: its traditional policy of neutrality, also recognized by Tehran, and above all the geographical position of its main terminals such as Salalah, Duqm, and Sohar, which are located outside the Strait of Hormuz.
This crisis has accelerated strategic reflection in all Gulf countries, turning the search for alternative routes from a mere theoretical exercise into a real priority of national and economic security.
WHAT IS IMEC
Launched in 2023, IMEC was born with a clear and ambitious goal: drastically reduce the vulnerability of European and Indian supply chains to traditional maritime chokepoints.
Through an integrated network of ports, railways, and logistical connections, the corridor was meant to create an efficient land and sea bridge between Europe, the Arabian Peninsula, and India.
The political framework that made this project possible was represented by the Abraham Accords of 2020, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries and raised hopes for a further expansion of this normalization to the rest of the Gulf.
Instead, the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Israeli military campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and finally directly in Iran completely overturned the scenario.
The Gulf governments, led by Saudi Arabia, are today extremely reluctant to any initiative that might make them appear politically or strategically aligned with Israel, fearing internal and regional repercussions.
THE ISSUE OF ISRAEL’S ROLE
The situation was further complicated directly by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has repeatedly publicly emphasized that a post-conflict solution should include the transit of Gulf oil and gas through Israeli territory to bypass Hormuz.
This emphasis ended up turning IMEC, in the eyes of many regional actors, into a project hostile to Iran, exposing it to the concrete and constant risk of direct attacks or those carried out through proxy militias.
Completely excluding Israel from the project does not seem a feasible solution: key partners such as India, the United States, and important European countries like Germany, close allies of Tel Aviv, would most likely block the initiative in its entirety.
On the other hand, Riyadh and the other Arab Gulf states reject the idea of a structural and lasting dependence on Israeli infrastructures, which constitutes a major problem especially now that secure access to the Mediterranean has become a strategic necessity that can no longer be postponed.
ALTERNATIVE ROUTES
While Europe continues to debate, Saudi Arabia is moving forward decisively on building alternative routes.
Egypt, excluded from the original IMEC design, has become the privileged partner: Riyadh intends to transform it into a solid Mediterranean outpost closely connected to its ambitious NEOM logistics hub, also supported by the construction of a massive $4 billion bridge.
International shipping companies like MSC are already launching combined transport services via Egypt and Jordan, demonstrating concrete interest from the private market.
Even more significant appears the turn towards Syria. Saudi Arabia is actively courting the new Damascus government and declares itself ready to invest billions of dollars in the country’s reconstruction in order to obtain credible Mediterranean access independent of Israel.
At the same time, fiber optic cable projects are being redirected through Syria instead of Israel, while the idea of a large railway passing through Turkey, Syria, and the Jordanian crossing of al-Haditha is taking shape, which would directly connect Saudi markets to European ones.
The route through Iraq is instead discarded due to the strong Iranian influence perceived in Baghdad.
All these initiatives, however, require delicate and complex political and diplomatic coordination: precisely the area where Europe can and must play a leading role.
THE ECFR PROPOSAL
The central proposal of the paper is clear: Europe must lead a profound redesign of IMEC based on deliberate route redundancy.
Multiple and alternative routes are needed that can quickly absorb commercial flows when one is compromised by tensions or attacks.
This is not simply a concession to Gulf partners, but a direct strategic interest of the European Union, which needs secure and diversified supply chains.
From a purely logistical point of view, Israeli ports show obvious limits: Haifa, the largest, handled about 1.5 million TEU in 2024, a modest capacity compared to hubs like Alexandria in Egypt which exceeds 5 million.
The new corridor should therefore fully leverage Oman and Qatar as alternative entry points: Omani ports enjoy a natural position outside Hormuz, while Qatar offers unique capacity in air freight transport.
THE POTENTIAL OF IMEC
Beyond logistical resilience, IMEC can and must become a tool for political stabilization.
Inclusive projects, involving as many regional actors as possible and creating shared economic interests, make any attack much more costly for whoever carries it out.
A promising example is the possible corridor through the Yemeni region of Hadramawt, which would connect Saudi Arabia directly to the Arabian Sea, definitively bypassing Bab al-Mandab and offering the various southern factions a concrete interest in cooperation and stability.
Supporting these alternative routes does not mean giving up the defense of freedom of navigation in international straits. Europe must maintain a firm line on this principle, both for legal reasons and to prevent the small Gulf states from falling into total dependence on Riyadh.
Still, there remains an uncomfortable truth according to Bianco; no critical infrastructure will ever be truly safe without a general climate of de-escalation. Without broader political stability, every new route risks simply becoming a new target.
For this reason, infrastructure projects must accompany, strengthening it, diplomatic action. Europe, the author emphasizes, should strongly promote regional crisis management mechanisms capable of drawing clear red lines around civil and commercial infrastructures, preventing attacks on routes from becoming the norm in contemporary Middle East.
