The Franco-German-Spanish project for the “Fcas” fighter jet has failed, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron have agreed to halt the joint combat aircraft project, delivering a fatal blow to the largest European defense program; what can be expected now?
Thundered so much that it rained, meaning that disagreements between France and Germany, in particular, but not only, between French and German industries on the Fcas have emerged several times in recent years. They were due to the fact that the French Dassault wants to have a leading position on the core platform that does not correspond to the balance of budget between French and German investments, which is rather equal, also considering the increase in the German defense budget over the last four years. Probably France will take the path of a national procurement program to develop a sixth-generation fighter entrusted to Dassault, in continuity with the practice that led to the Mirage and Rafale. Moreover, Dassault does not have a tradition of international cooperation in the air combat sector and has always favored French programs.
If Paris proceeds alone, is it inevitable to expect Germany to join Gcap, the combat air system program born from cooperation between Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan?
For Berlin, there is still a question mark. At the political level, Germany had invested heavily in the Fcas project, especially during the Merkel government, despite the German air force having expressed doubts several times because the requirements did not perfectly match those of the French.
Therefore, for Berlin, there is a need to find a solution that meets its military needs, guarantees an adequate industrial return to Airbus, particularly to the German component of the European group, and is consistent with the increase in defense investments decided in recent years by the Scholz and Merz governments.
It should be remembered that for Germany, developing a new generation fighter independently would be a novelty. Berlin boasts over half a century of experience in cooperation with Italy and the UK, first on the Tornado and then on the Eurofighter. Subsequently, it tried the path of cooperation with France. Historically, therefore, Germany is more inclined towards multinational programs.
Nothing can be excluded at this stage because many things are changing in Europe, but a continuation of the German cooperative tradition seems more plausible. With the French option gone, the only concrete European alternative remains Gcap with Italy, the UK, and Japan. Not by chance, Chancellor Merz and Prime Minister Meloni had already preliminarily addressed the topic a few months ago.
Sources from the German government have indicated that both parties jointly concluded that Dassault and Airbus failed to reach an agreement on the fighter’s development. Is it just an “industrial crisis” or a strategic crisis between the two countries? In other words, is the Paris-Berlin defense axis cracking?
France and Germany continue to cooperate structurally. The bilateral relationship is supported by the Élysée Treaty and a dense network of political and military consultations that is not even remotely in question. That said, the failure of Fcas cannot be reduced to a simple industrial crisis. It is also a political failure because the French country system failed to bring Dassault to a position consistent with that pursued by the Macron presidency. We are talking about nine years of negotiations, significant political investments, and very high expectations. The fact that no agreement was reached says something deeper: in the air combat sector, the industrial interest in France to carry out national programs still prevails. A trend that had already manifested itself in other past initiatives such as the Neuron program.
And on the German side?
When there is a divorce, responsibilities are shared, but it must be recognized that international cooperation cannot be based on the assumption that only one company, Dassault, does most of the work on the most strategic technologies while costs are shared more or less equally. It must also be recognized that today’s Germany is different from that of nine years ago. Chancellor Merz openly talks about the need to build the strongest conventional army in Europe. Berlin is in favor of cooperation, but not at any price. So if conditions are perceived as inadequate or unfair, Germany leaves the table. We are not facing a structural crisis of the Franco-German axis, which will continue to represent one of Europe’s pillars, but the realization that in this case the conditions for a strategic agreement were not met. And Germany has made the point that it is not willing to agree at any cost.
Does the failure of Fcas also represent a blow to the very idea of integrated European defense? Is it an incident or a sign that large European multinational programs are becoming increasingly difficult to realize?
It is necessary to distinguish the operational level from the industrial one.
Europe’s defense continues to materialize mainly within NATO, albeit with a European pillar destined to strengthen. At the operational level, cooperation therefore continues.
European defense cooperation and integration at the industrial level – capacity development, development of interoperable, interchangeable capabilities, with economies of scale thanks to joint projects, with common logistics, maintenance, and training – is undergoing a phase of change because larger national defense budgets give many European governments the perception that they can make national choices since they are no longer in the economic constraints of ten years ago.
In some cases, this assessment may be correct; in others, it risks proving an illusion. The development of extremely complex and costly platforms, such as a sixth-generation fighter, can exceed the financial capabilities even of countries like France and Germany.
For this reason, two opposing trends coexist: on the one hand, international cooperation; on the other, the temptation of national solutions. The consequences of the Fcas failure will largely depend on Germany’s next choice.
Why would the German choice be so decisive?
Because if Germany joined Gcap, the historic core of cooperation that gave birth first to the Tornado and then to the Eurofighter would be reconstituted, with Germany, Italy, and the UK together again.
The program would remain global thanks to Japan’s presence but would take on a much stronger European dimension thanks to Berlin’s economic, industrial, and military weight. It could therefore become the main point of reference for other European countries.
How so?
Because it would offer all the typical advantages of a large joint program: interoperability, economies of scale, shared maintenance, common logistics, and integrated training.
A joint program bringing together three of the main European economic and military powers could attract further memberships. Also because the transatlantic cooperation model of the F-35 jet will hardly be replicable. The United States does not seem willing to promote new forms of open collaboration of that kind, especially with this administration, and Europeans do not want dependence on American platforms, especially with this administration.
If Germany were to enter Gcap, conditions would therefore exist for the program to become the main European project for the sixth-generation fighter.
What will Spain and Belgium do, respectively the third partner and observer member of the now-defunct Fcas?
As for Spain, it seems difficult to imagine that it could proceed alone alongside France after the failure of the Franco-German agreement. Madrid will also have to decide how to orient its future aeronautical capabilities, and it seems to me that the Sanchez government is not inclined to purchase American F-35s. The same applies to Belgium, which participated in the program as an observer. These are countries with budgets smaller than Paris and Berlin, but the question of what to do also arises for them because the European cooperation option that was Fcas no longer exists.
